Balancing the World Order

This module’s reading by Daniel Nexon titled:  “The Balance of Power in the Balance” hit on many of the questions I wrote in the margins after reading Waltz for an earlier module.  Essentially, I wondered if Waltz’s assertion is correct about the tendency of states to balance against states that aim to acquire excessive power, how then did they allow the United States to emerge in its modern form?  I was happy to see this question addressed by Nexon in his piece.

Nexon introduced the idea (which is growing in popularity), that states may, in fact, bandwagon with the stronger states against the weaker states, which appears to be the case post-Cold War.  States like Ukraine, previously in the Soviet Union’s orbit, were attracted to the Western way of doing business and jumped on board with the United States and its sphere of influence.

Waltz suggests that there are structural elements at play which will drive states to balance, but as Nexon points out, there is a flaw with this line of thinking.  For starters, it “almost always begin[s] with realist assumptions” (p. 339).  When we deconstruct these assumptions and instead adopt a more liberal take, we might understand why states would allow a single hegemon like the U.S. to emerge.

One example would be the idea of the “status quo power”, which chooses not to challenge an emerging power because its emergence is beneficial to them.  This is likely the case for the European powers who watched the U.S. emerge and chose not to balance against it as the Marshall plan was helping them to rebuild.

The question I take away, however, and look forward to discussing further in class, is what exactly will drive a state to bandwagon?  While there are certainly realist (interest-based causes) that might drive states to support the emerging hegemon, there also appear to be soft-power, ideological reasons, which drive states to support the status quo due to alignments with the rules and norms put in place within the current international order.  This likely explains the emergence of the U.S. as a hegemon and its ability to remain there for so long without any real effort to balance against it by the majority of the world.

Daniel H. Nexon, “The Balance of Power In the Balance,” World Politics 61:2 (2009).

China as the Greatest Threat to U.S. Hegemony?: A Reflection

This week’s debate caused me to deeply reflect on the idea of China and its ability to challenge the U.S. as the current world hegemon.  Before our discussions both in class and in the formal “debates”, I would have definitely gone straight to China as being the most substantial threat to American hegemony (and truthfully, was hoping our group could debate from this perspective).  Today, however, I am not so sure that is the case.

In assessing who possesses the ability to challenge a hegemon, you must first assess the metrics you are using to define that hegemon.  In the case of the United States, there appears to be three primary boxes to check: military power, economic power and soft power. 

Realists who subscribe to a Waltz-like view of the world would argue that military power is the most important metric to use when assessing power equilibriums (polarity and hegemony).  If we adopt this approach, China is decades behind the United States.  As we mentioned in our rebuttal, the Chinese spends about a sixth of what the U.S. does on its military and by even the most liberal estimates, is decades (if not a generation) behind U.S. tactics and technology.  With this in mind, it would be very difficult to make the argument that China has the ability to challenge U.S. hegemony at any point in the foreseeable future.  Additionally, in Waltz-like fashion, we don’t see a large number of powers working with the Chinese in an effort to “balance” global power.  One would think that if the Chinese were emerging as a potential challenger, numerous powerful states would bandwagon with them to offset U.S. influence.  At present, Russia (and potentially North Korea, though that’s a tough one) serves as the only real “ally” China has and we have seen the rockiness of this relationship play out on numerous occasions.

An additional approach to adopt would be to look at this dynamic from the perspective of economic gains.  This is where, in my opinion, the best case can be made to support Chinese ‘challengership’.  That said, however, there are a few problems with this approach.  For starters, the Chinese economy presently remains considerably behind that of the United States, particularly when regarded in terms of per capita GDP.  Additionally, how China chooses to leverage its economic growth (and the means it adopts to get there…which will be discussed momentarily) matters a great deal in determining whether or not its economic growth will actually matter in the long run.  Team China suggested that economy matters most because states must use the wealth they acquire to support their military.  If, however, China continues its current trends in military spending (as a percentage of GDP), when compared with the U.S., it will take an incredibly long period of time for them to even reach equilibrium with the U.S., let alone surpass it, despite its economic gains.

Finally, the soft-power approach must be considered.  While it is easy to argue that the United States’ influence abroad is in decline, we mustn’t forget just how influential the U.S. really is.  Today, you can travel almost anywhere in the world and find evidence of the United States…be it a McDonald’s, Nike shoes, or Microsoft computers.  The U.S. principles of freedom, its economic and political models of governance, and the capitalist principles it pioneered are incredible popular the world over and the same simply cannot be said for China.  Additionally, there is a great deal of political tension within China that would prevent it from being able to use its economic gains to truly beef up its military.  Instead, wealth would need to go toward strengthening China domestically to improve quality of life and this would offset its ability to compete with the U.S.  If it decides instead to neglect its people in favor of a military buildup, then it risks creating tension so substantial, it would negate any ability the state has to truly influence the rest of the world as it would be distracted by domestic disputes and legitimacy challenges. 

Consistent with the “constitutional moments” approach, the U.S. was able to seize upon the period post-WWII to really establish itself the world over and to embed its principles and ideologies within the construct of the current international system.  In order for China to do the same, something (like a world war) would have to occur to shake up the status quo, in which case, any number of powers have the potential to ascend into the U.S. role, with no guarantee that China would possess the capacity or the influence to do so.

All of these objections to the concept of China as the greatest threat to American hegemony emerged as a result of the research and discussions conducted for this module’s debates.  It was incredibly insightful and caused me to reflect upon many of the assumptions we have about the present international system.  I think the biggest takeaway here is that perspectives really matter in discussing international relations (or politics in general).  Depending on what mode of personation you adopt on the 2x2, you could get a number of different answers concerning the current state of affairs and who is the greatest challenger to whom.

Scrutinizing the Transnational: Advocacy Networks, Criminal Organizations and State Authority

This week’s discussion about transnational advocacy networks gave me a great deal of pause in reflecting back to discussions from a previous module about transnational criminal organizations.  Specifically, we discussed how transnational criminal organizations challenge state power and also briefly discussed how transnational advocacy networks do so in kind.  With that said, how can we distinguish one from the other, particularly when dealing with advocacy networks that engage in criminal activity?

In their piece titled: “Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics”, Keck and Sikkink argue that these advocacy networks are important because they “multiply the channels of access to the international system” and are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (p. 2).  Couldn’t a similar argument be made for international criminal organizations, which also multiply access channels and have the capacity to share values and exchanges with nation-states or other criminal organizations? 

Keck and Sikkink go on to say that these advocacy groups “bridge the increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms” and “gain influence by serving as alternate sources of information” (pp. 4-9).  Could we not make a similar argument for organizations such as the Taliban and Hamas, which likewise bridge these artificial divides and provide information (and much more) to both its “citizens” and the greater international community at large?

We have established that both of these powers possess the ability to erode upon state power and authority, with both challenging its authority in different ways.  Transnational advocacy networks appear to challenge state authority by working across sovereign borders and hierarchies to streamline international exchange and to influence behaviors.  Transnational criminal organizations, on the other hand, appear to challenge state legitimacy, either by calling into question its ability to defend/control activities within its own borders or by soliciting doubt about the state’s ability to act within the confines of the established international order (i.e. a state government leveraging criminal organizations to supplement its own security forces).

Much like transnational advocacy groups, Phil Williams, in “Transnational Organized Crime and the State” puts forward that “although drug trafficking groups and other transnational criminal organizations represent both private power and private authority, they are not averse to appealing to more traditional state authority when the need presents itself” (p. 166).  That is to say that like transnational advocacy groups, criminal organizations can borrow state legitimacy and leverage it to their own advantage.  One example would be criminal organizations using borders as a means to avoid being pursued and arrested for their crimes or by leveraging laws in one state against those of another and manipulating gray areas to protect their interests/activities.

Ultimately, both transnational criminal organizations and transnational advocacy networks serve to erode upon state authority and relevance.  That said, the differences between the two are not as substantial as at first they appear.  Both lack any formal “legitimacy” within the international system and both will borrow state legitimacy when it suits them.  

Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders (Cornell, 1998)

Phil Williams, “Transnational Organized Crime and the State,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge, 2002)

Europe, Authority, and Symbolic Technologies: The EU as the Vision of Good?

In her work titled “Constructing Authority in the European Union”, Kathleen McNamara makes a strong and compelling argument for the role of “symbolic power” and “political technologies” within the international system.  These technologies, she argues, have helped lend the European Union its legitimacy and within the context of this module, really seem to allude to the existence (and importance) of the global public sphere.  That said, I actually disagree with the use of the European Union as an effective example and contend that today in Europe, there actual exists a trend away from the sorts of identities McNamara discusses. 

As one of the core points in her argument, McNamara contends that legitimate authority is essentially socialized into the governed and defines it as “the ability to induce deference in others” and to “achieve a significant level acceptance without coercion” (p. 153).  The EU, therefore, has become incredibly influential and plays a considerable role within each of its member-states domestic affairs “precisely in its distinctive nonmilitary and noncoercive character”  (p. 156).  This is the first point of contention for me in this piece.  The European Union exists due to a series of binding agreements, which are designed to penalize member-states who refuse to comply with mandates.  Indeed, there is a long list of infringement procedures to be used when states fail to properly or fully implement EU law.  These procedures could easily be regarded as a form of coercion.  Though they may not be “military” in nature, one could certainly argue that the combined force of Europe’s military powers combined is certainly taken into account when actors choose how they wish to deal with mandates coming out of Brussels.

On page 161, McNamara goes on to argue that, “Governance implies self-regulation, rather than direct control, and therefore involves subjective identification and compliance” (p. 161).   She speaks of using what are essentially ‘symbolic technologies’ (as discussed by Laffey and Weldes) to “control” state actors.  Citing Bordieu, she says that “symbolic power” yields bodies like the EU “the power to construct or ‘constitute the given’” (ibid).

This is also an area in which I disagree.  While I certainly accept the notion that the European Union can easily be regarded as a symbolic technology that acts as a form of “identity” for Europeans to buy into (and that brings certain sets of rules and norms along with it), I do not believe that all or most of its member states behave the way they do because of this association.  Examples across Europe, from Britain to Romania to Bulgaria, can be found of large protests where the European Union flag is burned and where the state flag is held up in its place.  Many states reject the notion that the European Union should trump or supersede the authority of its sovereign state and this is one of the significant factors that eventually led to Brexit (and could potentially lead other states to follow suit).

That so many across Europe reject the notion that a “European” identity is superior to their national identities seems to fly in the face of McNamara’s principle of “banal nationalism”, which the author states, “are reproduced on a daily basis through banal and mundane ways, and it is those habits of mind and practice that underpin national identity” (pp. 163-164).  This banal nationalism certainly might explain why many EU states (such as Luxembourg, Belgium, and Slovakia) feel very “European”, but fails to explain why so many other states, such as Greece and UK and Ireland feel the same.  In a survey conducted by the EU, 70% of those surveyed from Luxembourg identified as “European”, as did 67% and 66% for Belgium and Slovakia respectively (European Commission, n.d.).  Meanwhile, only 33% of British interviewees identified in kind (ibid).  This large disparity suggests that perhaps there are other factors driving this self-representation of “European” and perhaps it existed long before the European Union was chartered.

European Commission (n.d.), Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/topics/fs5_citizen_40_en.pdf

Kathleen McNamara, “Constructing Authority in the European Union,” in Who Governs the Globe?, ed. Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan Sell (2010)

Closed Borders: Nationalism and the Closed Economy

In my interactive assignment for this module, I leveraged this week’s readings to make a case to incoming Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador to resist urges within his country to close its borders and to avoid limiting interaction with the international economy.  While the economic theories from the readings were the focus of my paper, I spent quite a bit of time reflecting on the causes of this inclination to close borders as well, which is what I intend to explore briefly in this week’s post.  Specifically, I want to address a similar urge popping up within the United States and Europe, which seem to be directly linked to nationalism and this constructed sets of identities that establish the principles of “us” and “them”.

As President of the United States, Donald Trump has been one of the most vocal advocates for adjusting U.S. trade policy to focus on “America First” as he and his supporters would have it.  This ideology calls for an increase in tariffs on imported goods and penalizes international trading partners.  While the idea appears to be purely economic in nature, there are also other forces at work. 

In addition to being known for their nationalistic economic approach, team “Make America Great Again” is also known for its somewhat extreme (and discriminatory) immigration policies.  The Trump Administration has been in the news quite a bit for its child separation policies, its ‘Muslim Ban’ and of course, the premise of building a “big, beautiful wall” along our southern border.  The wall (in very Game of Thrones-like fashion) is a great metaphor for the nationalist tendencies exhibited by the administration.  What exactly is the wall designed to keep out?

Harkening back to Hobbes, I remember being particularly intrigued by his remarks in Chapter 13, which read:   “What opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests” (p. 58).  This question could just as easily be posed concerning the Trump administrations regard for immigrants (legal or otherwise).  What regard does the administration have for immigrants that it wants to construct a wall to keep them out?

Constructivists might suggest that this leads to the establishment of identities that enable us to determine the “us” and the “them” among us.  The “us” needs to stay out and in a zero sum, Hobbesian way, if the “thems” gain; it is to the loss of the “us”.  In assessing the relationship between this desire to close borders in conjunction with a desire to close international trade, a case can be made that the tendency to close borders may well coincide with nationalist upswings within nation-states.

A similar example exists in the European Union, where the Great Britain recently chose to withdraw due to similar nationalist tendencies.  Even in France, with the candidacy of Marine Le Pen, who identified a large a growing nationalistic movement within that country’s borders.

It appears as though there is a relationship between nationalism and the idea of shifting to a more closed economy.  Closed borders and a closed economy tend to lend themselves well to the constructed identities that nationalists often identify with, promoting the idea that ‘what is best for us is all that matters’.  In reality, however, as nearly all of the authors we read for this module pointed out, doing so often has a negative impact on the economy.

Hobbes, T. (2000). Leviathan. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

Bargaining Chips

 

"The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."

-        Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War

 

I’d like to preface my reflection by saying that the one phrase that really stuck with me in this week’s soliloquy is: “the states that have freedom will act as they will. And the less powerful are the ones who are subject to what the powerful dictate.”

 

I have often thought about countries such as Georgia and Ukraine in this context. I have often asked the question, as the post-Soviet countries try to carve their way out of the rubble from the collapse of the doomed union, can they ever truly achieve their independence? How do they perceive independence – what does it mean to them? As Georgia has been paving its path to joining NATO, and has been aspiring to become an EU member, it has consistently failed to achieve either. It’s been documented that some member countries, Germany and France in particular, have denied Georgia gaining membership with the sole purpose not to antagonize Russia.     

    

Going back to Dr. Jackson, he explains there exists a formal anarchy between states, but while they’re actually legally constituted as being relatively similar actors, there are differences of capacity between states. Therefore, countries like Georgia and Ukraine that no longer wish to be associated with Russia, have turned into bargaining chips for the power players of the international realm. Given that there’s always been a hierarchy in practice, even if states such as former Soviet countries that became legally autonomous from one another make their own decisions, it is certainly obvious that some states simply have more power or capacity than others. I would argue that as Dr. Jackson divides states in the international system up into three categories (great powers, middle powers, and peripheral states), I would add a category for “bargaining chip countries”. As powerful states fight proxy wars (in possible peripheral states), and try to gain control over smaller states by either political influence, and divide up the world in parts they have most control in, they use some countries as bargaining chips, to negotiate with more powerful states.

 

Looking more closely at the relationship between Germany and Russia, it has been an interesting one. Both state leaders have been in power for far too long, and Germany’s dependence on Russia’s fuel supply has been constant. This trading partnership has created an odd couple that begs questions on Germany’s loyalty, values, and place in alliances, in light of Russia’s behavior toward the West, particularly in recent years.  

“Bargaining chip countries” make even more sense with respect the game the hegemonic institutions set up and participate in: this is a global order created by the dominant, not purely coercive, but rather, it comes with benefits provided to those who participate.

Celebrity Diplomacy Is a Good Thing

In this post I want to focus on the Heribert Dieter and Rajiv Kumar article from this module, "The Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy: The Neglected Complexity of Development". It is clear that the authors do not think highly of celebrity activism. They claim that celebrities lack the competence and legitimacy to deal with international issues and their actions may do more harm than good on the efforts they focus on. I disagree with this conclusion and think the author's focus in on examples that reaffirm their position rather than look at celebrity advocacy and its impact as a whole.

The primary example the authors focus on is Bono's efforts to help Africa. They claim the singer's efforts to raise aide for Africa could be doing more harm than good. Rather than raising the ability of African's to deal with problems themselves, they are creating a beggar's mentality that will prolong the continent's suffering. They argue that good government is a necessity in order for the "Big Push" of aid to help. I would counter that Bono's job and mission is not to build good government. That is not something an outside actor is responsible for. That is the job of the people of Africa. Bono is merely an advocate and is bringing attention to the plight of the people. He's not claiming to be a diplomat who will solve government disfunction. He's an advocate who is trying to provide aid to the people who are suffering.

In this example, obviously Bono is not qualified to deal with all the complexities of the situation. He's a singer not a diplomat. This fits their conclusion that celebrities lack the competence to deal with major global issues. But what about the plethora of other instances of celebrity activism where the celebrity involved is more than competent enough to make a difference? Consider Emma Watson's involvement in the HeForShe Campaign for example. In addition to being very well educated, she has on-the-ground experience working on these issues and her efforts have helped change the global conversation around gender equality. Another example to consider would be Bill Gates. Through his efforts, the Gates foundation has essentially eradicated Polio. This is no small feat.

In my opinion, Dieter and Kumar exaggerate the negatives of celebrity involvement and assume that all celebrity advocates are trying to solve fundamental problems of governance. This is simply not true. By and large celebrities are just advocating to bring attention to issues and drive conversation that will inspire change. Some will take on larger roles on issues and try to be involved in the solution, but rarely do they do this alone. In these cases, the celebrities usually work alongside actual experts in the field to derive and implement solutions. This article also does not consider the good that celebrities have already done through their activism. Without the involvement of celebrities like Bill Gates, Emma Watson, or Bono - many issues would still be on-going or worse than they were before.

Overall, I was not a fan of this article. If Dieter and Kumar want to make the argument that there negatives to celebrity activism, then they should show evidence of this from more than just one case study. I will concede that it does make one think about the potential side effects of celebrity activism, but in general I think the conclusion is misguided.

Source:
Heribert Dieter and Rajiv Kumar, "The Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy: The Neglected Complexity of Development," Global Governance 14 (2008)