When Authority Lacks Capacity: A Case Study of the ICJ

As Professor Jackson noted, while authority means you have the right to do something, it does not guarantee that you have the capacity to do so. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the judicial body of the United Nations, has authority over UN member states. However, it’s capacity is limited. Although there are various modes of proving the ICJ’s jurisdiction to hear cases regarding international law, they lack an enforcement mechanism. I argue that, when it comes to matters requiring sanctions, judgments, etc., an institution’s capacity is only as great as its enforcement mechanism. A lack of enforcement mechanism, then, undermines the authority of the institution and only serves to reinforce state sovereignty. Further, I argue that states—as participants in and designers of the institution itself—protect their own sovereignty through the very construction of the ICJ. 

Take for example, a case between State X and State Y brought to the ICJ. The Court has treaty-based jurisdiction. The ICJ sides with State Y, and, in its judgment, asserts that State X must pay retribution to State Y. The Court cannot force State X to do anything, so the disputing parties are left to essentially self-enforce any judgment. The ICJ’s relevancy, then, is quite immeasurable; though it retains the authority to make a judgment on the case, its capacity to do so is limited as it lacks any ability to ensure the judgment is carried out. Though the ICJ’s authority may be seen as a way to mitigate conflict which can arise from state sovereignty, its limited capacity actually reinforces state sovereignty, as either state in the case retains the right to refuse compliance, retaliate, etc.

Member states designed, participate in, and perpetuate the ineffective capacity of the ICJ, thereby covertly protecting their own sovereignty. The most prevalent example of this is that the UNSC has the ability to enforce ICJ judgments but, historically, has not done so. This suggests that the Security Council want to avoid impediments to state sovereignty (i.e. enforcement mechanisms), as this could affect their home-state if they are a party to the dispute, or could set a future precedent, putting their home-state’s sovereignty at potential risk. In this way, states preserve their sovereignty, as well as issues of power, territoriality, and security (all of which may be case-issues that the ICJ would preside over).

I never thought I would take such a realist-stance on a subject but analyzing the ICJ in this context is quite compelling to me. I struggle to think of any other compelling reason to explain why an institution’s capacity would be so obviously limited—and without objection—despite their authority. 

Do States Guard All Areas of Public Authority Equally?

In his lecture "Politics as a Vocation",  Max Weber defines the state as "a human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force." The key claim here is the monopoly on the use of violence. As was covered in the asynchronous lecture, the sovereign territorial state will jealously guard this legitimate use of violence as it is the means to ensure its existence. After all, a state that cannot resist an insurrection, invasion, etc. will not remain a state for long. 

At the end of the lecture, Professor Jackson posed several questions but the one stood out to me was, "do states guard other areas in which public authority might arise with the same vigor that they do in the control of violence?" After giving it some thought, I would argue that they do. Reason being: every area of public authority comes back to the monopoly of physical violence. By defending an area of public authority, they are, at the same time, guarding their public authority over the legitimate use of violence.  

Take for example, the right to tax. A surface level evaluation of this public authority one might see it as an area states might not protect at the same level as the use of physical force. But consider why anyone pays their taxes - it's because states have the monopoly of physical force to ensure taxes are paid and violators are punished. Same goes for the "right to regulate trade". States can use force to ensure compliance with trade laws and punish those who violate the law. Refugee control is another example of a public authority that is tied to that of the use of physical force. 

I am by no means set on this answer, but I'm having difficulty thinking of an area of public authority that does not tie back to, or is not guaranteed by, the use of physical force. Could be the new tie to the realist perspective and that I'm seeing security as the fundamental concern of every state. Would be curious to see other's thoughts on this question. 

*While thinking about this question and discussing with a co-worker, I may have stumbled upon a potential anomaly to the claim that sovereign states will jealously defend their authority over the legitimate control of physical force: Japan in the 1940's. Following the end of WWII, Japan did not seek to build an army, or develop nuclear weapons. They were happy to acquiesce a certain amount of control and occupation to the United States. In this instance, did Japan not guard the use of physical force as one would expect a sovereign state to do? Or were they so soundly beaten that they were almost not a sovereign territorial state at the end of WWII and this decision was imposed upon them and they did not have a choice in the matter?

International Law and State Sovereignty

What most of the questions that Professor Jackson asks at the end of his fourth soliloquy seem to have in common, is that they all address how states deal with their politics from inside the state. Sometimes, peace and conflict are determined by the policy structures and processes, as well as politics and organizations from inside the state. It also has a lot to do with the regime type, and the perception of the state’s leaders (and at times, their religious leaders as well). A state’s past history of its security goals often determines the dynamics of that state’s foreign and security policies. Security relations between states are determined by their abilities to identify, prevent, and resolve conflict. One of the most important aspects, I find, is the degree to which state policy is a result of rational choice versus biases that arise from bureaucratic, psychological, partisan, and ideological influences.

When Prof. Jackson asks whether there are ways of strengthening an international law without abrogating state sovereignty entirely, the question I would be asking is, whether states are interested in strengthening the international law in the first place.

Take ICC, for instance. As the International Criminal Court (ICC) was set to gain jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (activated in July 2018), the US government was opposed to it, saying that the perceived uncertainty around the application of the crime of aggression could deter states from participating in humanitarian interventions or military missions where the legal basis is controversial. The State Department’s position in 2015, in Under Secretary of State Sarah Sewall’s words, was that “we fear that one of the effects of activating the ICC’s aggression jurisdiction will be to create new potential obstacles to military action when it is urgently needed to save innocent lives.”[1]

This amendment extends the ICC’s jurisdiction beyond the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. There are barriers to its application, interpretations of its meaning, and the political interests involved however, making aggression difficult to prosecute.

Some scholars involved in the drafting process explain that only a war of conquest and a hegemonic war would constitute a crime of aggression. In addition, the crime of aggression cannot be applied retroactively, making the prosecution of some leaders, e.g. Russia’s leaders for annexing Crimea in 2014 impossible. The crime also only applies when committed by state parties or when the Security Council decides to refer it to the court. Given that major powers like the US, Russia, and China are not members of the court, wars started by the nationals of these states will likely not be referred to the ICC.

Not even a situation like the 2003 Iraq war would fall under the definition. While the US-led intervention violated the UN Charter, the intention to destroy weapons of mass destruction would make the violation less absolute. In which case, all humanitarian interventions would be excluded as they do not constitute a “manifest” violation. Aggression would only apply in the rare unambiguous case, like the 1990 attack on Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s’ forces.

The political interests of UN member states make the application of the amendment to the ICC a very complex matter. As with the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the ultimate effectiveness of this expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction will be determined by the willingness of member states to comply. Given the complexity and the considerations at stake, the application of the crime of aggression in the foreseeable future is highly unlikely.

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[1] https://reliefweb.int/report/world/icc-jurisdiction-set-expand-will-states-be-deterred-war

Organized Crime: A Realist Approach?

Williams' piece discusses the relationship between transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and the state. His approach to framing this subject seems to have roots in realist theory, particularly in its concept of "survival strategy" (173). When the government fails to legitimize itself, thereby failing to secure the safety and prosperity of its citizens, citizens' are incentivized to engage in criminal activity.

Realist theory asserts that actors--living in a state of anarchy--are motivated to secure their own power and security. As such, I would argue that survival strategy is a result of anarchy. However, we have mostly discussed in class thus far the notion of states acting to preserve these preferences, not so much individual actors within the state (i.e. citizens) doing so. There seems to be some symbiosis between this concept of state preservation and individual preservation, which can cause tension when the two conflict. If we look at this from the top left box of the 2x2, we might view the citizen and the state each as its own billiard ball. When the interests align (i.e. the state is securing the citizens' preferences, in turn securing its own), there is little clash between the billiard balls. But, when the state fails to do so, there is conflict, thereby resulting--in this example--in crime, as a means to the citizens' end.

What is most interesting perhaps is the way in which the citizen billiard ball becomes one, rather than many. In a situation where the state lacks legitimacy and sovereignty, there is collapse. Therefore, the citizens--and their government--can no longer be considered a whole unit comprising the state. Despite the anarchic nature of society, individuals at some point band together into one unit in order to encourage their own preservation. In this instance, organized crime provides this preservation by securing them territory, money, etc. It is important to consider the factors that might influence individuals, even acting out of self-preservation, to change their allegiance to a difference sovereign, or to find alternative routes of preservation (i.e. organized crime).

In this way, it appears that the role of the individual is quite critical in supporting the significance of the state in realist theory. While we refer to "the state" and its preference for sovereign territoriality, power, and security, it appears that the state is only as powerful as its ability to preserve these same interests of its citizens.


Phil Williams, “Transnational Organized Crime and the State,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge, 2002).

Is Fundamental Change Possible?: A Response

The class debate on the nature of the international system and its ability to be changed was incredibly riveting and forced me to carefully consider my position as both sides made very strong arguments.  Ultimately, my personal position was shaped in part through this debate process and in the end, I find myself favoring the idea that change is entirely possible.  After reading through the posts numerous times and nitpicking as best I could (trying on each of the different models discussed in the readings for this module), I find that I accept Waltz’ general ideal that security matters most of all to states and therefore would go further to state that understanding the threats to states will determine how states will structure themselves in response to it.

I came to this conclusion after carefully reviewing the arguments made in the debate, with a few particular items standing out.  On the pro side, the fundamental point being made is that there are numerous examples of cooperation taking place within this anarchic international system which simply cannot be explained by traditional realist thinking.  As we stated in our opening statement: “Realists accurately apply rational choice, but fall short in contemplating how their choices can develop into powerful arrangements when coalesced with like minds.”

Cooperation can be advantageous to states in ways that may conflict with what is perceived as their “interests”.  Neorealists argue that security is more important than power and therefore, we were able to contend that sometimes cooperation is the best way to get at security.  The international system can certainly seem structural and binding, but that structure and those bounds have the ability to produce rational outcomes that are fundamentally different from what we might expect (or fundamentally different from what we had previously grown accustomed to).

In their rebuttal, the con team made the argument that the quest for power and security will always drive state actors and that because limited resources and conflicting interests are inevitable, so too is the probability of war and the constancy of the international system.  A couple of major points that I, as a pro-teamer, really took issue with was the apparent equivocation of “power” with “security” and the definition of ‘fundamental’ change. 

Concerning the former, the con team made the following statement within their argument: “As long as actors worry about their security or have concern about imbalance of power and/or resources, the international environment will remain unchanged”.  From my perspective, the difference between “power” and “security” is important and worth noting.  Naturally, if a state has more power, it will presumably be able to provide more security…or will it?  Waltz discusses the importance of balance and in Risk-like fashion, actors will need to act to prevent any one state from gaining too much, therefore ultimately diminishing their own security. With that said, cooperation and security alliances, such as NATO, represent rational institutions that were created to address exactly these sorts of problems.  The question that I find myself asking in making this distinction between power and security is: “What if a rational institution like NATO expanded so far that it encompassed all states in the system”?  This would respect Waltz’ argument that security is most important and this would certainly increase security for all parties, drastically reducing the likelihood of war.

This leads to my second contention with the con argument, which is how they define fundamental change.  Would the aforementioned example represent “fundamental change” based upon their definition?  They defined fundamental change by stating: “Fundamental change, in our view, would require actors to give up or evolve their current sovereign territorial claims and entirely eliminate their fear for their own security and desire for power.” If we follow through with the example of an ever-expanding security agreement like NATO, wouldn’t that meet their definition for fundamental change? 

A fair question to follow would be: “Is such a broad expansion possible?” To answer that, we’d need to answer whether or not each state possesses the agency to take part in such an alliance.  From my perspective, the answer would be “yes”.  Harkening back to Goldstein and Keohane, actors would need to possess “shared beliefs about the spirit of agreements” as these “are essential to the maintenance of cooperation” (Goldstein & Koehane, 1993, p.19), but assuming these shared beliefs were held, can we not maintain that change is possible?

Finally, even if we do not assume that states would ever be able to come to terms with such an alliance, is it not fair to maintain that if security is the biggest focus for all players that understanding the nature of threats to security serve as a major factor for determining the nature of the system itself and its ability to change?  If threats to security are rapidly changing, does it not follow that the system itself therefore must change with them?  Modern “threats” are defined by things like international terrorism and climate change…issues that have no respect for the boundaries we’ve established around each other.  If threats have ways of absolving boundaries, actors must do so in kind if they are to remain protected from them. This is especially true in a world with ever-capable technologies such as UAVs, powerful SAM systems, and of course, nuclear weapons.  If we can turn on these technologies and increase the cost of war such that no state will be interested in waging it, isn’t it fair to say that other major states are no longer to be viewed as “threats”?

The con team argued in their first rebuttal: “The system may change, but the nature of the international environment cannot.”  I am inclined to agree with this assertion, but would argue that the nature of the international environment, by their own definition, does not need to be changed in order to constitute fundamental change.  The ways in which we respond to the threats posed by the international environment is what is ultimately at issue and personally, I maintain that we must understand threats if we are to understand the international system and its ability to change.  Because threats are constantly changing and evolving, so too is the international system and therefore, I state as I did in the debate, that fundamental change is not only possible, but occurring every day.

Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework. Deas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Goldstein - Ideas and Foreign Policy.pdf

Ideation and Neorealism: A Different Perspective

In reading Kenneth Waltz’ piece, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory”, I find myself reflecting back to Module 2, where we first started working with the 2x2 and where we started to distinguish between the “personation” of actors and the boundaries they find themselves interacting with.  This module really brings that concept together.  The Waltz piece suggests that “structure” produces these boundaries and ultimately drives the interests or ideas (depending upon your perspective) that determine their actions. 

Waltz adopts a “structural realist” perspective, which holds the same assumptions that traditional realists do concerning the anarchic state of the international order and the importance of power and balance.  Unlike traditional realists, however, Waltz puts forward the idea that security matters most of all (moreso than just raw power) and that states are not necessarily inclined to relentlessly pursue power for the sake of power alone.  Rather, he suggests that there are systemic conditions that drive states to act the way they do and understanding this structure is more important than understanding the interests or ideas motivating the individual states themselves.  He suggests that “destabilizing developments” will inevitably occur in this system, which will require states to act.  When and how states act in response to these trigger events will determine whether or not the outcome is war or peace.

The pool table analogy is often used to describe Neorealist theory in that individual states are like billiard balls.  While the balls themselves are markedly different (different colors, different numbers, etc.), their differences are essentially irrelevant when it comes to their movement across the table.  The balls, regardless of their color or number, are all bound by the same “rules” established by the “system” or table itself.  They can only move in certain directions because of the structure of the table and the game they find themselves in.  Additionally, when they make contact with each other, sometimes it’s intentional and sometimes it is not.

I find this particular take on realism to be an interesting one, because it makes both the Goldstein/Keohane and the Laffey/Weldes arguments relevant. While Waltz tends to focus on the former, saying “the prolongation of peace requires that particularly destabilizing developments elicit the interests and calculated response of some or all of the systems principle actors”, ideas in the form of symbolic technologies or ideas as “principled beliefs” have the ability to produce action within this system just as much as state interests do (Waltz, 1988, p.620).  In response to these “destabilizing developments”, instead of using rational calculation to determine their next moves, states could just as easily respond based on institutionalized norms or moral obligation. 

Cases of humanitarian intervention under the prevue of treaties and negotiated contracts such as “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) illustrates this point in contending that states may decide to act in response to humanitarian crises across the world despite the cost of doing so and despite the lack of calculated gains to be made as a result.

An example would be Operation Restore Hope, which started in 1992 as a result of mass famine and over half a million dead citizens in Somalia.  The decision to deploy forces to Somalia could very well could have been due to the U.S.-held belief that allowing so many to die due to famine was simply morally wrong (principled belief) and therefore, must be stopped.  Alternatively, the invasion could be described from the perspective of Laffey and Weldes, and one could state that the U.S. viewed itself as the state inherently responsible for the maintenance of “world order”.  With this view in mind, the U.S. had no choice but to intervene as its self-proclaimed image (or “symbolic technology”) of “world protector” or “guardian of freedom and justice”, compelled it to act militarily without the need for any rational calculation or anticipated gains.

The constructivist view articulated in the Onuf and Wendt articles offer an interesting alternative to this point of view, which I am excited to discuss further in class.  That said, the real question that I am left pondering as a result of this week’s readings is: “Are structures malleable or are they constant”?  The relationship between “structure” and “agency” is a complicated one, as surely we cannot assume that states must have zero agency if a structural perspective is to be applied.   How much agency is required in order for the “structure” of the international system to be “fundamentally” changed and can it ever be possible for us to do so?  I look forward to discussing this and more in this week’s class session.

Waltz, K. N. (1988). The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(4). Retrieved May 31, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Waltz - The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.pdf.

Reflection

Overall, I felt the debate both in our Activity and in class went well. Both teams did a good job articulating their points while maintaining their assigned POV. Personally, I found it a little overwhelming participating in the debate in class for two reasons. One being that I am not the most comfortable speaking in class, and the second being that it can be challenging to respond immediately to a prompt from a POV you may not necessarily agree with (for example, when asked to discuss from the liberal perspective how the end of slavery signaled a fundamental change).  

I think the most notable distinction between the two perspectives in regard to fundamental change is the definition of fundamental change itself. However, in discussing this distinction, it further reinforced my affinity for the liberal perspective of change in the international sphere. We cannot discount the interconnectedness of states’ ideas, and the impact that this has on promoting a large-scale change in the international realm. One shift in an individual or group of individual states attitude towards a concept can have a snowball effect on the greater global picture. 

Like Victoria mentioned in her reflective blog post, fundamental change is possible, but can happen at a “glacial pace.” This is why discussions on this topic can be so hard—it is difficult for us at times to even conceptualize a fundamental change in international relations because we may not see it for decades to come. The consequences of a change in states’ ideas may not come to fruition globally anytime soon, and as such, examining the relationship between the individual and the bigger picture becomes more challenging, 

I also briefly wanted to touch on our discussion of the North Korea/US summit. As we were discussing its potential (or lack thereof) for encouraging change, I couldn’t help but think of the discussions I overhear in the bar I work at. I come from a relatively small town, with a majority conservative population. As a bartender, I overhear any mention of politics between customers and immediately brace for impact. Too many beers + conflicting opinions on politics = BAD. Anyway, my Monday night shift was filled with discussions of the upcoming summit and many praises for Trump for “getting this done!” I mentioned I was surprised he had time to do so with all the work he’s doing draining the swamp. They didn’t catch on to my sarcasm. I don’t have much of a point other than to say that, as students of international relations, I really appreciate that we can truly study these theories and form our opinions on the current political picture in a more well-rounded way than those who might only get their information from the media. 

North Korea, Russia, China, U.S. - Billiard Balls, Anyone?

What a great class discussion we had last night!

When we were initially assigned into groups, I wondered how we’d assume our roles and argue our points if we sometimes agreed with the opponent? Would that necessarily be a bad thing?

Is fundamental change possible? The answer to me is obvious, which is why it was a huge relief finding out I was in the Pro group! But then, does that mean I do not see any actions of any states as a realist? Not at all!

With the 44th G7 Summit coming to an end, we have managed to polarize the rest of the world just a bit more. Well, maybe not all of it. The question at the heart of this blog is, why are we interested in bringing Russia back onboard? What have they done lately that earned them a spot back in the club? 

As we lash out on our allies and engage in trade wars with them, we arrange meetings with ruthless dictators. Using the 2-by-2, it is no mystery where we fit in, along with North Korea and Russia. After all, don’t each of us do “what we want” and “when we want” with our hard boundaries and autonomy? Hard and impermeable, right now we are the billiard balls in the upper left corner of the 2-by-2.

The truth is, there are different types of actors, and that is at the heart of the questions about change. I look forward to exploring this further in my paper, but one thing I found interesting last night was the discussion of definitions. Democracy, war, borders - aren’t they all open to interpretation? In a monolithic world we would have an entirely different discussion, but we are lucky living in the world that has seen many fundamental changes!

Week 6: Post-Debate Reflection

This week's debate about whether or not the international environment can be fundamentally remade was a good challenge and made us (me at least) re-consider our preconceived ideas on the topic. Going into the project, I was firmly fixed in the top-right quadrant and would have said undoubtedly yes - the environment could fundamentally change.

After the exercise, I am not as firmly fixed in that position and am unsure whether this fundamental change is actually possible - especially if we stick to how our Con Team defined it: a catalyst that leads to complete restructuring of the environment as we know it. Actors would need to give up or evolve their current sovereign territorial claims and entirely eliminate, for good, their fear for their own security and desire for power. Prior to the project I would have been much more adamant that change is possible - whether because of the impact IOs and NGOs can make, or because of changes in states themselves. But now I am not so sure that is a realistic possibility in the grand scheme of things. As long as even 1 person has a desire for more (power or resources), or fears another actor, this condition will exist. 

While the Pro-team primarily stuck to the Liberal Institutionalist argument, during the debate someone made a counter-argument from a Constructivist point view and that was helpful to me personally as it helped break through some of the fog in my head that surrounds that position. The example given in the debate was of Iran's constitution and how the people's identity and ideas shaped the language of the constitution. Despite it being against their interest at the time, being a new revolutionized country with not a ton of power, the people drafted a constitution that portrayed their view of themselves in their world. This identity, and the constitution of the country, has led to their self-interest and has shaped the countries actions since that time, and it has impacted the international system as a whole.

I've been having trouble fully grasping this Constructivist viewpoint, and still have some questions which I'll bring up next session, but that example given as counter-argument to the Con perspective was helpful. 

Identity Impact on 2x2

In Alexander Wendt's "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", he comments that "a state may have multiple identities... the commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world." (p.398)

Aside from being a mouthful, this segment of the article stuck with me as I continued with the other asynchronous material. It's a very interesting concept - how an actors identity can shape their interests and actions. I can see identity playing a role in Agency and Structure, with varying identities allowing for more agency or more structure. But I also have been thinking about the roll an actor's identity can play in the 2x2, and how the change in identity could result in a change what box the actor is in.

Take the US for example. We have many identities, with some more pronounced at times than others.
Over the past 2 years, our "identity" has shifted drastically. Under the new administration, our nation as an actor identifies much more nationalistic and self-centered than we did under Obama. Additionally, outside actors have seen us in a much more negative light and identifying us as much more difficult to work with and harder to read. I think this change in identity has seen our country move more toward the Autonomous + Impermeable box than we were under Obama.


In class this week, I hope that we discuss more the role of identity in shaping an actors motivations and placement in the 2x2, as well as how an actor's identity can influence a potential pathway to change.

Source: Alexander Wendt. (Spring, 1992.) "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization, Vol. 46. No. 2. Published by The MIT Press.

Consequences & Intentionality

In his Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations, Onuf discusses the concept of rules and consequences. He asserts that rules make individuals into agents who, through acts and the social and material consequences of these acts, make the social reality of their world. I am intrigued by his discussion of the intentionality of consequences, wherein he says that through agents’ observation and acceptance of consequences, “such consequences are then no longer unintended in the usual sense of the word” (6). Agents may then pursue different acts to change said consequences, which may produce more consequences in turn. 

This idea of intentionality/un-intentionality in terms of consequences puts a whole new perspective on the concept of social reality. If social reality is determined by the consequences of agents’ actions, and agents are constantly in observation of said consequences (and have the ability to act according to said consequences), it does remove all sense of the term “unintentionality.” Though Onuf maintains that personal autonomy is limited by the (also limited) autonomy of others (20), his argument still seems to put quite a bit of emphasis on individual agency. An individual, in observing the consequences of action and inaction, then acts with full intentionality.

I'm trying to work through this in order to understand the consequences (no pun intended) of a lack of un-intentionality on international relations. Onuf clarifies that consequences are no longer unintended in the "usual sense of the word," so I don't believe he is assuming that agents act with full intention. I think it is rather that agents have the capacity to foresee consequences of their actions or, even if they cannot foresee them, can "accept" them after the fact and then base their actions on this observation. In this way, this concept seems tied to the "interests" box in the 2x2 model, as actions (either the first action or response) is carried out with some level of attention paid to the strategic environment.

Onuf, Nicholas. “Constructivism: A User’s Manual” in  Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in social theory and international relations. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013. 

The reason the Cold War never became a hot one is…

My last week’s presentation focused on the Revolutions of 1989. The topic of the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union was commented on by my classmates, providing great insights. One thing we all agree on, is that neither Goldstein and Keohane, nor Laffey and Weldes are able to provide a full explanation of why communism collapsed. In this week’s blog, I’d like to address the topic through Kenneth Waltz’s article The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory (1988).

 

I’d like to start by pointing out one distinction I often see confused, which is the difference between the Soviet Union (one country) and the Soviet Bloc (the Socialist countries in Eastern Europe, not part of the Soviet Union).

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a confluence of many factors leading to its demise. The unsustainable nature of the communist regime was fueled by economic hardship and ethnic tensions. Later, the collapse of the Soviet Union produced all “new” nation states, returning to their ethnic roots and pursuing their values. In turn, they affected other states and the relations among them.

Yet another explanation is a leader-led change, by President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev, as well as the nuclear arms race (and ultimately deterrence) between the Americans and the Soviets. President Reagan’s preferred method of containment was escalation of military spending, and he was credited for winning the Cold War “by his willingness to spend the Soviets into oblivion through expensive programs such as his Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars,” as a means of defending the U.S. and its allies from nuclear attack.

Back to Waltz’s article, the characteristics of the bipolar world are: “self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face them.” Waltz explains that Realist theory draws attention to the crucial role of military technology and strategy, and nuclear weapons dissuade states from going to war much more surely than conventional weapons do. Waltz is a believer that deterrence is not too hard to achieve, when it comes to a nuclear world. Because a country cannot rationally attack unless it believes that success is assured. “A nation will be deterred from attacking even if it believes that there is only a possibility that its adversary will retaliate. Uncertainty of response, not certainty, is required for deterrence because, if retaliation occurs, one risks losing all.”

Waltz believes the reason the Cold War never became a hot one is because of the presence of nuclear weapons. What are your thoughts?
 

Engel, Jeffrey A., Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Kenneth N. Waltz:“The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (1988)