Ideation and Neorealism: A Different Perspective

In reading Kenneth Waltz’ piece, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory”, I find myself reflecting back to Module 2, where we first started working with the 2x2 and where we started to distinguish between the “personation” of actors and the boundaries they find themselves interacting with.  This module really brings that concept together.  The Waltz piece suggests that “structure” produces these boundaries and ultimately drives the interests or ideas (depending upon your perspective) that determine their actions. 

Waltz adopts a “structural realist” perspective, which holds the same assumptions that traditional realists do concerning the anarchic state of the international order and the importance of power and balance.  Unlike traditional realists, however, Waltz puts forward the idea that security matters most of all (moreso than just raw power) and that states are not necessarily inclined to relentlessly pursue power for the sake of power alone.  Rather, he suggests that there are systemic conditions that drive states to act the way they do and understanding this structure is more important than understanding the interests or ideas motivating the individual states themselves.  He suggests that “destabilizing developments” will inevitably occur in this system, which will require states to act.  When and how states act in response to these trigger events will determine whether or not the outcome is war or peace.

The pool table analogy is often used to describe Neorealist theory in that individual states are like billiard balls.  While the balls themselves are markedly different (different colors, different numbers, etc.), their differences are essentially irrelevant when it comes to their movement across the table.  The balls, regardless of their color or number, are all bound by the same “rules” established by the “system” or table itself.  They can only move in certain directions because of the structure of the table and the game they find themselves in.  Additionally, when they make contact with each other, sometimes it’s intentional and sometimes it is not.

I find this particular take on realism to be an interesting one, because it makes both the Goldstein/Keohane and the Laffey/Weldes arguments relevant. While Waltz tends to focus on the former, saying “the prolongation of peace requires that particularly destabilizing developments elicit the interests and calculated response of some or all of the systems principle actors”, ideas in the form of symbolic technologies or ideas as “principled beliefs” have the ability to produce action within this system just as much as state interests do (Waltz, 1988, p.620).  In response to these “destabilizing developments”, instead of using rational calculation to determine their next moves, states could just as easily respond based on institutionalized norms or moral obligation. 

Cases of humanitarian intervention under the prevue of treaties and negotiated contracts such as “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) illustrates this point in contending that states may decide to act in response to humanitarian crises across the world despite the cost of doing so and despite the lack of calculated gains to be made as a result.

An example would be Operation Restore Hope, which started in 1992 as a result of mass famine and over half a million dead citizens in Somalia.  The decision to deploy forces to Somalia could very well could have been due to the U.S.-held belief that allowing so many to die due to famine was simply morally wrong (principled belief) and therefore, must be stopped.  Alternatively, the invasion could be described from the perspective of Laffey and Weldes, and one could state that the U.S. viewed itself as the state inherently responsible for the maintenance of “world order”.  With this view in mind, the U.S. had no choice but to intervene as its self-proclaimed image (or “symbolic technology”) of “world protector” or “guardian of freedom and justice”, compelled it to act militarily without the need for any rational calculation or anticipated gains.

The constructivist view articulated in the Onuf and Wendt articles offer an interesting alternative to this point of view, which I am excited to discuss further in class.  That said, the real question that I am left pondering as a result of this week’s readings is: “Are structures malleable or are they constant”?  The relationship between “structure” and “agency” is a complicated one, as surely we cannot assume that states must have zero agency if a structural perspective is to be applied.   How much agency is required in order for the “structure” of the international system to be “fundamentally” changed and can it ever be possible for us to do so?  I look forward to discussing this and more in this week’s class session.

Waltz, K. N. (1988). The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(4). Retrieved May 31, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Waltz - The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.pdf.