Twitter Dogs

As one of our classmates noted last week, Twitter is a great example of a Global Public Sphere. Joking aside, how social media influences everything we think about every single day, is no laughing matter. Today’s article in The Washington Post reads: “Analysis: Dogs being used to make political statements on Twitter.”[1]

There is apparently an emerging ecosystem of satirical accounts for fictional animals that take on distinct political leaning. It’s an alternate universe full of alt-right dog politics, a community of gun-loving pets and a stream of angry capitalized barks by a watchdog sniffing out online racism. Each account comes with political and social commentary under the guise of a loveable avatar. While some are used for parody and others for a specific purpose, each is carefully curated to distinguish its own tone and content. Racism Watchdog alerts users to tweets with racist undertones, and Breitbark News relays its “alt-bite” conservative agenda through dog puns. Based off their political posts, these accounts are accumulating tens of thousands of followers who boost their tweets to virality.

The history of using animals for political and ideological purposes has a dark past. “One of the things that happened in early trolling spaces in the early to mid-2000s, (trolls) enjoyed juxtaposing cute animals, often cats, with absolutely disgusting, politically abhorrent views and statements,” the article reads. “It deliberately plays up the dichotomy between, say, a cute dog and misogynistic expression.”

Twitter is a breeding ground for trolls and bots, especially when it comes to political hot topics. The incontrovertible proof of Russia’s meddling in our elections, and interference with our democratic process, should be a wake-up call.  

The cyber sphere definitely is a global public sphere, and the damage it can bring is scary. Dark web and cyber-attacks aside, we need to think about how it influences the ways we might perceive our fellow Americans just for having opposing political views, and whose influence we realize it is after all.

---

[1] Terry Nguyen - The Washington Post - Monday, July 30, 2018

“That’s Not Who We Are”

 

Listening to this week’s soliloquy, I couldn’t help but remember the words: “that’s not who we are.” President Barack Obama uttered those words in so many of his speeches, there’s a YouTube collage summing them up to 46. I believe the reason this resonates with the Americans as much as it does, is because we are a nation based on values. Unlike any other country in the world, what unites us is not any one ethnicity, religion, or race. What makes us Americans is our values.

I would argue that we equate upholding our values with our identity, which is the reason why we consider Global Public Sphere to be very closely tied to Liberal Political Theory. The idea of public sphere for us means that public authority derives from the consent of those people on whom the authority is being exercised. In Prof. Jackson’s two-by-two, we represent the lower left-hand box, where we are deliberating the implications of the common identity that we hold together. Sure, there are differences amongst us, and we value individualism more than most other countries, but we make a clear distinction between what’s American and what’s un-American. Discussions on what kind of society we want to be may be carried out in the Supreme Court, as well as in our everyday conversations, but they always come down to what kind of society we want to be.  

On the other hand, there’s Constitutionalism, and we believe it’s very important to uphold our Constitution. The forefathers came together and decided on the sets of rules for presidency, government and legislature; we then let the Constitution decide how we are going to operate.

While on a grand scale we adhere to Constitutionalism, the Constitution sets the basic rules, and we come up with laws and deliberate the implications of the common identity we hold.

It is no surprise then, that as a society, we are constantly debating, how far can our government go? How do we protect our civil liberties? How do we uphold our values while fighting terrorism?   

Mythology of ukraine

Throughout the semester I've been trying to get a better handle on constructivism. While I still struggle to define the term, it's become easier to identify it in action in international events. I was recently listening to a Worldview interview on NPR and heard a great relevant example of constructivism.

The host was interviewing Mustafa Nayeem, a member of Ukrainian Parliament, former-journalist, and one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Revolution in 2013-14. In the interview, Mr. Nayeem discusses how Ukrainian "mythology", or ideology, has influenced the actions of the country to date and that Ukraine is in the process of going through an identity change. Prior to the revolution, Mr. Nayeem says that "Ukrainians had a history problem. (They) internalized a history of betrayal, suffering, and failure." This identity was responsible for disunity among Ukrainians and Mr. Nayeem hints that it is because of this identity that Ukrainians have continued to find themselves a repressed state (particularly by the Russians).

Mr. Nayeem goes on to say that Ukrainians need to start to mythologizing hope. There are a lot of positives happening in the country but it has not been in Ukrainian nature to talk about it. There are signs this is starting to happen and Ukrainians are starting to believe they can succeed. The revolution is a result of this shift in identity. Throughout the discussion Mr. Nayeem goes on to reinforce that when Ukrainians really come to believe that they can succeed, then Russia won't be able to continue to divide the country along ethnic lines. By changing their identity, Ukrainians will successfully be able to become a truly united and independent state.

Looking at the interview with Mr. Nayeem from a constructivist point of view, it is clear that identity has been key in the situation in Ukraine. Their identity to date has led them to being stuck in a revolving door of suffering and oppression, particularly at the hands of Russia. The identity has reinforced disunity among the people and made breaking from Russia very difficult. However,  identity is also going to play a pivotal role in helping Ukraine realize its dream of being a free and independent state. By continuing to change the nations identity and take on a much more positive view of self, Ukrainians will be able to overcome their past and build a new and brighter future.

Source: https://www.wbez.org/shows/worldview-podcast/discussing-state-violence-and-social-movements-with-mustafa-nayyem-catalyst-of-ukraines-maidan-revolution/cba4e595-381d-41f1-83b6-355b91e7212b

Trade (What is it good for?)

One of this chapter’s readings focused on international trade and its impact. There are reasons why nations trade, and why issues arise.    

Trading goods and services makes economic sense. We trade across borders for the same reason that we trade with people in our country. Issues seem to arise when we start trading across borders, however.

There are specific reasons why we trade certain goods and services. First is the absolute advantage. The principle of absolute advantage is that if a country does something better than anyone else, that’s what they will export. That’s what they mostly sell and buy the rest of the commodities. But since most countries are not absolutely the best in one particular thing, there is also a principle of relative advantage. That is when countries export what they’re relatively better at, compared to their competitors - what they can produce relatively cheaper and relatively better.

The reason countries trade with each other isn’t just the absolute or comparative advantages though. The next reason is economies of scale. Certain productive processes can be done better and more cheaply when done on a larger scale, and a good example would be the United States and Europe exporting large aircrafts to the rest of the world. Another reason for trade is product differentiation. This refers to all products not being the same, and customers having choices. For instance, wines from California differ from the wines produced in South Africa, Australia or Europe.

Trade across borders also ensures a competitive environment at home and around the world. It weeds out bad businesses and promotes the strong ones.  

Trade, for all of the reasons above, is a good thing, and a natural thing. It has many good consequences. It does, however, also have adverse consequences. 

Big companies lobby for protectionism from imports. Companies that are not competitive enough should in fact lose out when there is more trade, or free trade (comparative advantage is a dynamic concept). Consequences of free trade should not be of concern because the losing companies can shift to doing something else or reallocate their resources.

There are times when companies’ need for tax breaks and subsidies is justified – mostly in their infancy – but it becomes a problem when it never ends. In some developing countries there are family or tribal ties to the government or have no mechanism for fighting corruption.

International trade implies restrictions: taxes on imports (and sometimes exports) are called tariffs. But there are also non-tariff barriers, or quotas, which indicate how much you can import in any one year. Other non-tariff barriers are licenses (have to obtain one before importing something) or product standards (e.g. standards for food and medications, or pollution emissions).

In light of today’s tariff increases, it is interesting to look to some economic stats. Up until a little while ago, in the modern-day era, for advanced states/alliances like the United States, Japan, Canada, Mexico, and Europe the average tariff was 3% to 4%. It was just a small tax. The largest differences among countries are in non-tariff barriers. WTO has come a long way negotiating tariffs and quotas but has not come anywhere near as far in terms of negotiating on non-tariff barriers. The reason for this is that some industries are very sensitive to local political situations like trade in steel, agricultural trade, and trade in other raw materials. It is often because of the non-tariff barriers that resources are not efficiently allocated around the world; where some industries are artificially propped up and are artificially kept out in other places.

Another huge issue is protectionism. There are times when companies band together and lobby against trade, and that isn’t good for anyone.  

AU SISG-774         

Agency and Globalization

As we discussed in class, Frieden and Rogowski postulate that international trade constrains the state by creating preferences around it that did not exist before. As such, international trade has the capacity to impact domestic policy. I would argue, then, that states lack agency when it comes to participating in international change; therefore, liberal, international trade is inevitable.

In Module 3, we read Kenneth Waltz's "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." Waltz examines facets of the international war that are structurally induced (i.e. constant), thereby evidencing that states lack agency over not doing whatever said thing is. For example, balancing of powers and war have been constant throughout history, affirming structural theory that we do not have agency over not committing ourselves to these acts. This same theory can be applied to that of international trade/globalization. Trade between countries has been seen throughout history, and, as Frieden and Rogowski discuss, the state's preferences are shaped by international trade. It can be assumed then that globalization is a structurally induced part of international society, and states are bound to participate in it.

As a state's interests begin to be shaped around international trade, these same interests then constrain the state's agency. We might ask: if a state benefits from international trade so much so that it lacks any interest in opting out, how much agency does it really have? States have not only economic incentives to participation in international trade (i.e. making money through trade), but an interest in gaining resources. Importantly, in modern day, international trade makes possible the proliferation of weapons and intellectual property, such as new and innovative technology. Access to these resources is critical in a state's retention of sovereignty. Should a state opt out of international trade, they will fall behind in terms of military and technological capabilities, and will decrease their capacity to protect themselves and their citizens. As such, the state's interests are so much so impacted by participation in international trade that they have no agency in opting out.





Frieden, Jeffry and Ronald Rogowski, “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. by Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (Cambridge, 1996).

Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (1988).

Fate of Third World Countries

The Inayatullah reading this week focused on the sovereignty dilemma and how the modern international system has purposefully been constructed in a way to keep some states down. Inayatullah traces the fate of many of today's quasi-states back to colonization. He connects Adam Smith's division of labor to colonization in order to illustrate to the reader how "difficult it is to overcome a functional, specialized, dependent, colonial structure" (p. 62). Furthermore, Inayatullah derives the conclusion that "adequate wealth is a necessary condition for the realization of sovereignty" (p. 55). When you combine the social historical context with the division of labor metaphor and the requirement of wealth for sovereignty, the fate of Third World countries seems predetermined. Of course the sovereignty dilemma will exist among these quasi-states!

I drew a comparison of this fate of Third World countries the fate of underprivileged youth who grow up in the inner city. The system has been constructed to keep these kids down. They don't have the same opportunities or access that kids from suburban neighborhoods do. This context is important as it leaves much of their future, in a sense, predetermined.

I then recalled  a question posed early on in the chapter: "Does the weakness of Third World states remind us that they are only formally equal and only formally sovereign?" (p 59.) Inayatullah continues with this question asking if we should ask these Third World states to just face reality and accept a diminished status in the international realm.

At first pass, having developed somewhat realist leanings over the course of the semester, my answer was "yes". These Third World states, especially those that have been in the same state for generations, are not actually sovereign like the United States or Mexico is. They are not even sovereign like we would consider small states like Fiji. They should face the reality that the only thing protecting their sovereignty at the end of the day is power politics, which, for one reason or another, at the current point in time, favors them enough to allow them to retain their sovereignty.

I then revisited my underprivileged youth comparison and had a change of heart. Just like those kids deserve a shot (and all the help they can get along the way), so do Third World Countries. They are starting out behind the eight ball at no fault of their own and have a system stacked against them. This doesn't mean they should be resolved to being a quasi-state forever. Good news is there is precedent for states developing past this point already. India is a prime example. What once was a colony is now the world's 6th largest economy.

Additionally, while the international system has not seemingly changed, the norms of the system have. International organizations and NGOs have been formed with the sole purpose of helping Third World countries develop. Powerful states may not be quick to acknowledge or rectify the economic and societal pains their imperialist behaviors caused these states, but many actors across the international do. This has spurred a large effort to develop these Third World countries and bring them up to a certain acceptable standard. This development, in turn, is helping these Third World countries rid themselves of the sovereignty dilemma.

If you were to just look at the Inayatullah reading, the fate of Third World countries would seem predetermined and inevitable from a realist perspective - without the ability to generate adequate wealth, they would remain as a quasi-state with social and economic issues for the foreseeable future. However, if you embrace a more Liberal Institutionalist or even constructivist view and account for the impact of of IOs and a change in norms, your conclusion would be the opposite - Third World countries have the opportunity and support to develop past the sovereignty dilemma and become truly equal and truly sovereign states.

Sources:

1. Inayatullah, Naeem, "Beyond the Sovereignty Dilemma: Quasi-States as Social Construct," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge, 1996)

Political Power or Economic Power: Exxon Mobil

As we examine the difference between the economic power and political power, not only do we have to realize the correlation between the two, but also remember that power is a dynamic concept. There may be a clear distinction between the two, but a powerful private economic actor is fully capable of challenging these definitions.  

Philosopher Harry Binswanger describes this difference in his essay The Dollar and the Gun[1]:

“Political power” refers to the power of government. The special nature of that power is what differentiates government from all other social institutions, and its essential attribute is its monopoly on the use of physical force. Only a government can make laws, which in essence are rules of social conduct backed up by physical force. A government that has no power to use force is not a government. A non-governmental organization can make rules, pass resolutions, etc., but these are not laws because they cannot be enforced on those who choose not to deal with that organization. The penalty for breaking the rules of an organization or a club, e.g. (G8 turning into G7) Summit, is expulsion from the association. The penalty for breaking the law will result in fines or imprisonment.

Economic power is the ability to produce material values and offer them for sale. E.g., the power of big oil companies is the power to discover, drill, and bring to market a large amount of oil. Economic power lies in the cash and other assets possessed by businesses. A business can only make you an offer and present you with possibilities. The alternative a business presents you with in a free market is: “increase your well-being by trading with us or go your own way.” The alternative a government, or any force-user, presents you with is: “do as we order, or forfeit your liberty, property, or life.”

Journalist Steve Coll’s book “Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power”[2] challenges this notion that political power rules supreme. This book is about a private economic actor that has become so powerful, that it can sometimes go against U.S. foreign policy, often arrogantly declaring itself a global corporation not tied to the U.S. government in terms of policies, and then just as quickly lobbying for government support when such support is necessary to boost its corporate goals.

Coll describes Exxon Mobil as one of the largest, and most omnipresent, corporations in the world, covering the years from the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska through the explosion of BP's floating oil rig out in the Gulf of Mexico. It documents ExxonMobil's dealings in African countries like Chad and Equatorial Guinea as they negotiate with repressive dictators while managing security against insurgents in their own compounds and ignoring the horrific social conditions they see around them. For years, Exxon Mobil refused to acknowledge the problem of climate change, and created purposefully disingenuous studies to create confusion on the topic and delay government or social action.

---

[1] http://capitalism.org/power/

[2] http://www.librarything.com/work/12133834

The Interdependency of Political and Economic Power

A pro-Trump comment I often hear is that the US is a business, and "who better than a businessman to run a business." As much as I disagree with this position, I cannot deny that business and economics do play a substantial role in politics. This makes me think of the poll in our last class, which led to a discussion of economic vs. political power. I would suggest that these two types of power are inherently linked, and that one cannot be sustainable without the other. As such, the legitimacy of a state cannot be discussed without addressing both the political and economic power of said state. Furthermore, the state's interest in both protecting and restricting the authority of private corporations proves to be a complex issue.

The legitimacy of state sovereignty is determined by its ability to maintain authority and power. When we think of these two concepts, we often think "politics" (i.e. the majority political power within the state). Political power, however, is driven by more than just ideology; economic power is inherently linked to the capacity of political power because any source of power needs resources to drive it. We can, of course, look to the economic capacity of the government itself, but the economic power of the state is also driven by private corporations. We see clear examples of this right here in the US. Major corporations and donors back political leaders and parties which contributes to the capacity of said party/leader to spread their political ideology. Additionally, corporations which may not directly donate to a political party may support ideologies in line with a particular party, thereby proliferating this ideology. Think of companies that openly promote an anti-LGBT rhetoric, for example. This very public approbation of said ideology spreads to consumers, which then impacts and/or reaffirms their own political choices.

The clear connection between economic and political power means that the government's interest in holding private corporations accountable is a complex matter. On the one hand, the state wants to restrict corporations where possible so as to mitigate any possible threats to their own sovereignty. On the other, should the state pose as a threat to a corporation's capacity to make a profit or grow, the state may face negative consequences vis-a-vis the potential for economic support from the corporation. Instead of imposing restrictions and consequences on private corporations, I think we may see more covert ways in which the state supports corporations as an incentive for the corporation to support the state. For example, say a major pharmaceutical company provides major economic backing for the state. In return, the state may mandate a new vaccine that the pharmaceutical company manufactures. So, instead of acting as a threat to the corporation, the state provides an incentive for the corporation to maintain its financial partnership with the state. This then creates a symbiotic relationship, as the corporation does face the potential for the state to reverse its mandate should the corporation remove financial support to the state.

In theory, public government and private corporations should function separately, but the inherent link between political and economic power is clear. Both function at its fullest capacity when they act symbiotically.

The Tale of Two Summits

In Soliloquy number five Dr. Jackson notes that states’ autonomy and the ways in which actors present themselves are just as relevant to the business and economic realm as they are to global security.

In light of the recent NATO Summit, this statement couldn’t be truer.

President Donald Trump discussing financial commitments of its member countries was at the heart of this year’s summit. Some news media outlets referring to it as “the tale of two summits,” President Trump’s reflection on the summit promised the Americans an increased spending by contributing states to 4%. French President Emmanuel Macron, on the other hand, revealed that the detailed communiqué released after the summit shows the measures approved by all the member states, and it reaffirms a commitment to 2% in 2024.

The U.S. contributes 22% of the NATO budget, followed by Germany (14%), France (10%) and Britain (9%). Most other member countries’ contributions are significantly less.

NATO expansion has been an important issue for aspiring countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, seeking protection by the alliance from Russia. The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have been luckier than their former Soviet counterparts, obtaining their membership in 2004. Like many other countries, these three have not regularly met the 2% goal (the NATO guideline is to spend a minimum of 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense), even though they seek protection from Russia more than most other member states. In 2015, as predicted by the European Leadership Network (ELN), only one of the 14 nations examined, Estonia, would meet the 2% target. By way of comparison, Estonia was spending more than the other two Baltic states, Lithuania and Latvia.

As the contribution dispute has mainly focused on financial commitment, military contributions, which have not always been met either, should also be noted. As an example, in 2011 just 15 of NATO’s 28 member states contributed in some way to the military operation in Libya.

States Holding Corporations Accountable

In class this week we briefly touched on methods in which states can hold corporations accountable. Collectively as a class we struggled to answer to this question. However, I think states frequently act to "check" the power of corporations and hold them accountable when they overstep or abuse their public authority using two methods: fines and creating new laws and regulations.

Fines are one way a state acts to hold a corporation accountable. A timely example of this can be seen in the UK. Just this week a UK watchdog, the Information Commissioner's Office, levied a $664k preliminary fine on Facebook for the Cambridge Analytica scandal. This fine was in response to Facebook mishandling user data and allowing a third party to improperly access data on millions of users. Being a global corporation, this could set the precedent for action on this issue by governments and we may see other states follow suit. This fine is the UK attempting to "check" the actions of Facebook and hold them accountable for violating the rights of UK citizens.

Creating and implementing new laws and regulation is another way states will hold corporations accountable. An example to look at is the BP oil spill in 2010. In response, President Barack Obama signed an executive order that put new rules in place that required corporations, like BP, to adjust how they operate. The US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management said that these new rules were "the most aggressive and comprehensive reforms to offshore oil and gas regulation oversight in U.S. history". New laws and regulations "checked" the power of corporations and limit their freedom of operation.

Both of these methods are reactionary tactics. States, at least democratic ones, tend to only hold corporations accountable once they have crossed some sort of line or when there is a large public outcry. Rarely do states take preventative action to limit a corporation, nor would this be received very well by the free-market. The good news though is that fines and the creation of laws and regulations are successful in checking the power of corporations and force them to change their operational procedures. Unlike in the international realm, corporations do abide by state rulings and states have the power to enforce their measures. So while these checks may come after the harm has been done, they are effective in holding corporations accountable.

Sources:
1. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. "Executive Order 13547 - Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes". The White House President Barack Obama. Retrieved from: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-stewardship-ocean-our-coasts-and-great-lakes 

2. Tony Romm and Elizabeth Dwoskin, "Facebooks is Slapped With First Fine for Cambridge Analytica Scandal". Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/2018/07/10/5c63a730-848b-11e8-8f6c-46cb43e3f306_story.html?utm_term=.aedba945bf35 

Financial Nationalization

Haggard and Maxfield's chapter, "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World" discusses "financial internationalization" - a trend in which developing countries have opened their financial systems in the past decade by liberalizing capital flows and the rules governing. In all the case studies, the countries went through a liberalization of their financial policies in response to a crisis. Haggard and Maxfield state that this is due to international systemic pressures which limit a developing countries agency in choosing their international financial policy. Between a combination of the balance of payments crisis and the effects of increased trade and financial interdependence, actors are almost forced to liberalize their financial policies.

After completing this chapter my first thought went to the United States and our recent foreign policy shifts. It seems like we are doing the exact opposite of what this chapter discussed. If developing countries are going through a trend of "financial internationalization",  I see the United States and  other developed countries are going through a trend of "financial nationalization".

Changes in financial policy are to be expected when there is a change in government. Haggard and Smith pointed out that in each of the case studies changes of policy only occurred following changes of government. Additionally, this change doesn't have to towards liberalization. As pointed out in the Mexico case, during the early 80's Mexico went through a period of nationalization and Haggard and Maxfield say that a "nationalistic response appears to suggest that crises are just as likely to lead to foreign exchange and capital controls as they are to liberalization" (p 229). The recent financial nationalization measures taken by the Trump administration are a clear adverse reaction to the policies of the previous administration.

The global reaction to the new US policies also support Haggard and Maxfield's claim that international systemic pressures are heavily involved in states international financial policy decisions. There is severe international backlash at the "financial nationalization" by the United States and the system is not making this easy (or a smart) policy decision for the U.S.

Historic trends would suggest that the U.S. will eventually revert back towards "financial internationalization" and adopt more liberal financial policies. In the 1980's Mexico went through periods of financial nationalization but, due to new financial crisis, were pulled back toward liberal policies. Let's hope that when the United States does eventually revert back towards financial internationalization, it is not because of a financial crisis that results from this period of financial nationalization.

Sources:

1. Haggard, Stephan and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World" in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. by Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (Cambridge, 1996).

Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Authority

A state's protection of intellectual property rights vis-a-vis the pharmaceutical industry serves as a great case study of the relationship between economic and state authority. In particular, it may be argued that collective efforts to improve global healthcare indicates no fundamental change in the ways in which states preserve economic authority over their industries. In looking at the efforts of NGOs, states, and international institutions to improve access to life-saving treatments globally, we see what appears to be the beginnings of a global sphere bound to a set of shared values, rather than markets driven by profit or preservation. Still, Big Pharma and states’ decisions to contribute to global health care initiatives are ultimately driven by material gains.

Gutner evaluates the efforts of the World Health Organization, World Bank, NGOs, and individual state to facilitate access to healthcare globally, particularly for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis treatments. Since 2000, AIDS treatment prices have dropped over 100 times, and many pharmaceutical companies offer pricing on a sliding scale, thereby improving accessibility. Simplistically, this appears to represent a global commitment to public health. In actuality, states are encouraged to contribute to fighting health endemics through the promise of lower tariffs, patent protection, and other gains.¹ In this way, large states exercise their authority and ultimately preserve their preference for retaining power over their intellectual property, economic structure, etc.

A point most notable to this argument is that of regime shifting. Powerful states like the US worked to shift matters of intellectual property rights (like pharmaceuticals and technology) to other international institutions in advance of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), an agreement which addresses matters of global health as it pertains to a state’s intellectual property rights.² The result was a complex international arena in regard to intellectual property rights which ultimately benefits larger states by allowing them the flexibility to retain these rights which contribute to the state's economic authority. This reaffirms the realist theory of international relations, i.e. that a state's main interest is preservation of power and resources. 

1. Tamar Gutner, International Organization in World Politics (California: SAGE Publications, 2016). 

2. ibid  

Global Economy and Government

To better understand and make educated arguments on the topic of global business and economic autonomy, I am going address government’s role in an economy[1].

What is the role of government in an economy, or what should the role of government be? Are state governments only expected to intervene at times such as the Great Depression? Do governments of all states try to maximize welfare and development? Do all states try to minimize corruption, or are there governments that maximize the opportunities for corruption and the opportunities for bureaucracy?

Institutions, such as the World Bank, look for connections between the extent of corruption and bureaucracy and poverty, and have tried to quantify the results of their findings, which happen to be striking. Not all states address the concern of incentives or disincentives and try to manage producer and consumer behavior. Economists in free markets have very different views of making an economy work, as opposed to the proponents of tougher laws and regulations. However, it is also very important for states to enforce laws in order to discourage opportunities for corruption. It is very important for the laws and regulations to be very clear as well, even if they are less than desirable, such as open discriminations (e.g. in favor of the Malay people in Malaysia).

State governments also manage property rights, and how they handle these rights may vary greatly among states. Not all states encourage ownership, everything from land or production rights to intellectual property rights, which helps an economy by encouraging the proper growth and development of their societies.

States have to play a constructive role: government officials and business leaders must lead by example and enforce laws against fraud. Government has a major role in managing (and in most cases, owning) essential public services. In some states, government agencies are not responsive to the public’s needs. As a result, not just in the U.S., but also in a number of countries, many public services have been privatized. We have prisons, hospitals, and public utilities, such as water and electricity that are either privately owned or run jointly with private management.     

When Dr. Jackson addresses the issue of private vs. state economic governance, one of the things, the economists argue, that governments really need to address the issue of externalities – which is what a private company experiences in terms of costs and benefits, when it differs from what society at large experiences in terms of costs and benefits. If we take pollution, for instance: when a company minimizes costs and maximizes profits, they could be ruining the environment for everyone else. This is where the government has to equalize public and private costs and benefits.  

While it’s important that government does something when public and private costs and benefits differ, what specifically is going to be done is up for discussion (fees, taxes, subsidies, etc.). Another issue many states’ governments are faced with, is the issue of short-termism, and having a vision beyond the next election cycle. 


[1] AU SISG-774

 

Exclusion Position on Proliferation

In reading Gusterson's article "Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination," I was particularly intrigued by the three different positions on proliferation presented. I would argue that the Exclusion position is the most compelling, although I am not so sure if this falls within the realm of realist or constructivist theory. Though these theories are fundamentally different, either may be used to explain this position in the current and historical context of international society.

The Exclusion position maintains that while nuclear weapons may not be any more dangerous in the hands of one party versus another (as Gusterson evidences in his refutation of the Western perspective of third world countries as the "Other"), nuclear weapons are a prerogative of power, and powerful states have no intention of allowing the powerless to acquire them. Gusterson uses compelling historical and sociological evidence to refute Western "Othering" in regards to nuclear proliferation, thus suggesting that the Exclusion position is the result of states' policy choices which perpetuate "neocolonial hierarchies and assumptions." Under constructivist theory, this would suggest that predominately White, European states' positions on nuclear proliferation represent their preferences for retaining racial ideologies. However, the Exclusion position might also be explained through realist theory, which would maintain the definition of the position--that powerful states want to preserve their power, thereby opposing nuclear proliferation in less powerful states.

The one caveat to this realist assumption on the Exclusion position, however, is this: Why are states with nuclear capabilities not in opposition to other nuclear states with as much vehemence as to the Other? I would suggest that constructivist theory would better explain this, as it still allows for state's with similar preferences (i.e. White, European) to retain nuclear weapons. However, as we read in Blair's article, it is clear that nuclear states like the US and Russia monitor nuclear activity with extreme vigor, always maintaining a hair-trigger response (and first-strike capability) if needed. This might be the realist response to the question I posed earlier in this paragraph.

I am curious if anyone else agrees that sometimes two different theories can explain the same international phenomenon, and sometimes finds it difficult to discern which might be the more compelling argument. This is something I struggle with with theory: I like for answers to be concrete and empirical, but that's not always the case when you have a concept that can be evaluated very differently from multiple perspectives.

Authority vs. Capacity: OSCE

An English language newspaper in the country of Georgia, Georgia Today, dated June 22-25 published a notice signifying Georgian President’s meeting with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ambassadors.

I find OSCE to be yet another international organization which has the authority but lacks the capacity to make change. The OSCE mission has proven its inefficacy in Georgia.

Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili, along with the deputy foreign minister, the President’s international secretary, and the parliamentary secretary, hosted the 25-member delegation paying an official visit to Georgia. The sides discussed the importance of OSCE support for the ongoing democratic processes in Georgia, with the special emphasis on security problems and the situation in the occupied territories. The President expressed that the occupied territories should not be left beyond monitoring and provided the Ambassadors with the detailed information on the policy carried out by the Russian Federation in the region.    

With 57 participating States in North America, Europe and Asia, the OSCE is the world’s largest regional security organization. The OSCE claims that it works for stability, peace and democracy for more than a billion people, “through political dialogue about shared values and through practical work that makes a lasting difference.” With its Institutions, expert units and network of field operations, the OSCE should address issues that have an impact on common security, including arms control, terrorism, good governance, energy security, human trafficking, democratization, media freedom and national minorities.

Originally founded as CSCE (Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe), since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CSCE role changed when The Charter of Paris for a New Europe was signed in 1990. In 1999, the OSCE called for a political settlement in Chechnya and adopted a Charter for European Security. For this reason, Russia referred to OSCE as a Western tool for "forced democratization.”

OSCE’s significance to regional governance in Georgia was made difficult by the hegemonic power, Russia, within the regional organization. The fate of the OSCE's Georgian field operations had been uncertain since Georgia’s war against Russia over the separatist republic of South Ossetia in 2008. The conflict resulted in Russia's occupation of large chunks of the territory of Georgia. Moscow recognized the independence of South Ossetia, one of Georgia's two separatist republics (the other is Abkhazia), and announced plans to set up military bases in both of these breakaway provinces. The OSCE mission to Georgia prior to August of 2008 consisted of a main office in Tbilisi, the capital, and a smaller, subordinated field representation in South Ossetia's capital. Their presence was mandated to serve as a base for eight unarmed OSCE military monitoring officers delegated to verify the implementation of the 1992 Georgian-South Ossetian ceasefire agreement. After the war an additional 20 OSCE officers were deployed to areas adjacent to South Ossetia.

Russia, claiming that "new realities on the ground" required a reassessment of the OSCE's presence in the region, said it would not routinely extend the mandate of the OSCE mission to Georgia for another 12 months, and suggested instead that the South Ossetia office be separated from the Tbilisi headquarters and that its status be upgraded to that of a fully-fledged mission. Other OSCE participating states rejected Russia's proposal, however as talks entered a deadlock, in December of 2008, Finland - which then held the rotating chairmanship of the OSCE - announced the imminent termination of the organization's mission to Georgia. At present, the mission officially remains in a state of "technical closure." Against Western demands that the OSCE monitors be allowed to move freely within their respective areas of responsibilities and across the de facto border, Russia asserts that guidelines should be developed with South Ossetia's consent.

This example demonstrates a regional organization having authority but lacking capacity, where a regional power is exercising its influence. Even when an organization is founded to ensure regional security and peace, or conflict prevention and the protection of human rights, confusing and overlapping mandates may reduce effectiveness, and regional policymakers and governments have limited resources for meaningful participation in multilateral forums.

Legitimate Use of Force & Power Politics

From Max Weber's definition of a state, we gather that the power of a state comes from its monopoly over the use of violence. States guard this use of force jealously and are not inclined to have other actors, especially foreign actors, challenge this right. However, if you look across the international realm, while sovereign states may claim a monopoly over violence, this claim is not equal. It is clear that power politics is at work in just how much of a "monopoly" states can claim over the use of force. 

Countries like the United States and Russia have much more of this authority, it seems, than smaller states like Ukraine or Mexico. Imagine the repercussions if a weaker state like Mexico were to invade Texas, reclaiming territory that it once used to own, and say this action was in response to  the treatment of its citizens at the border and who crossed into the United States? The response by the US, almost undoubtedly with physical force, would be swift and brutal. Much different than what we are seeing with Crimea. 

Even among states that are more equal in international power and standing we see this monopoly over violence differ - at least by acceptance of international actors. Take North Korea and Iran for example. The DKRP, one of the world's most repressive states with a long history of human rights violations, was praised by President Trump as "honorable" and seen as a willing and cooperative partner. Iranian leadership, other the hand, is seen by Trump as maintaining a "corrupt personal terror force and militia" and an arm of its military is even potentially being considered as a "terrorist group". In the eyes of the United States government, the authority and monopoly over violence is more legitimate in the DKRP than it is in Iran.

This authority over the use of violence matters for all nations. The legitimacy and recognition of this right by other actors in the international is extremely influential on what an actor can do both domestically and outside its boundaries. More powerful states can wield this authority seemingly when and where it chooses, whereas weaker states are more constrained in how they can exercise this right. Even domestically a weaker state has to be careful in how it uses its authority over violence.

This leads to some interesting questions:

1. Is the legitimacy of violence really that key of a defining aspect of a state? In other words, is a weaker state with less legitimacy over the use of violence, less sovereign than a powerful state? 
2. Is authority over violence in the international all based on power politics or are there other factors in play? 
3. Do smaller and weaker states actually have an authority over violence in the international or is any authority they do have authorized to them by the major powers?