As we discussed in class, Frieden and Rogowski postulate that international trade constrains the state by creating preferences around it that did not exist before. As such, international trade has the capacity to impact domestic policy. I would argue, then, that states lack agency when it comes to participating in international change; therefore, liberal, international trade is inevitable.
In Module 3, we read Kenneth Waltz's "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." Waltz examines facets of the international war that are structurally induced (i.e. constant), thereby evidencing that states lack agency over not doing whatever said thing is. For example, balancing of powers and war have been constant throughout history, affirming structural theory that we do not have agency over not committing ourselves to these acts. This same theory can be applied to that of international trade/globalization. Trade between countries has been seen throughout history, and, as Frieden and Rogowski discuss, the state's preferences are shaped by international trade. It can be assumed then that globalization is a structurally induced part of international society, and states are bound to participate in it.
As a state's interests begin to be shaped around international trade, these same interests then constrain the state's agency. We might ask: if a state benefits from international trade so much so that it lacks any interest in opting out, how much agency does it really have? States have not only economic incentives to participation in international trade (i.e. making money through trade), but an interest in gaining resources. Importantly, in modern day, international trade makes possible the proliferation of weapons and intellectual property, such as new and innovative technology. Access to these resources is critical in a state's retention of sovereignty. Should a state opt out of international trade, they will fall behind in terms of military and technological capabilities, and will decrease their capacity to protect themselves and their citizens. As such, the state's interests are so much so impacted by participation in international trade that they have no agency in opting out.
Frieden, Jeffry and Ronald Rogowski, “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. by Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (Cambridge, 1996).
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (1988).
I think that it is an interesting point you make, that international liberal trade is inevitable. I had not previously thought about this before the last class, but I suppose that it does make sense looking at the current institution of international trade. We have hit this level of open/free-markets that it would be near impossible to revert back to a time where countries could deny trade with the rest of the world. I am not sure about the argument used of states lacking agency, as I think states to have the capacity or ability to change international trade policies or practices, but they choose not to because of the benefits they observe.
ReplyDeleteSarah, I really enjoyed reading your blog this week, as I usually do! The points you make are not only interesting, but also make me want to discuss them more!
ReplyDeleteA state’s agency vs. trade makes a great point of discussion, because there are cases when trade is completely voluntary, but there are also instances when it’s not, or comes with a very high cost.
Whether a state is or is not engaged in international trade cannot be indicative of that state lacking agency. Yes, states make money through trade, as well as have an interest in gaining resources, but the answer sometimes is simple and practical. One country cannot be completely sufficient producing everything from steel to diamonds to plantain chips. The list can go on and on, the point of which is that countries have advantages in producing certain items (e.g. U.S. and Europe produce airplanes and sell them to the rest of the world), and consumers have preferences in consuming items from various producers of the world (e.g. consumers may prefer chocolates from Belgium or wines from France). Whether a state decides to trade or not to trade, does not necessarily have to be a threat to their agency.
There are of course instances where a trading partner for a certain resource can be difficult to alienate, or go against, as it appears to be the case between Germany and Russia. Germany’s dependence on Russia’s natural resources has not only been noted by the White House with respect to NATO, but also by its member countries, as Germany opposes the former Soviet republics to join NATO, out of the fear of angering Russia.
This is an incredibly interesting topic Sarah. Traditionally, economic practices and military practices existed squarely within the control of the sovereign state. Today, I agree with you in saying that this dynamic has shifted. That said, however, I think there may be a bit more to it than that. While external actors can influence a domestic economy, this influence does not necessarily have to change the behaviors of state actors. The decision to act in a certain way (or not to act) lies squarely within the control of the individual state and therefore, I would argue they retain agency. A good example would be North Korea. North Korea has been sanctioned by the international community and operated a very closed economy for quite some time. They have retained the agency to do so despite the costs and consequences against doing so.
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