Wednesday, July 4, 2018

Exclusion Position on Proliferation

In reading Gusterson's article "Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination," I was particularly intrigued by the three different positions on proliferation presented. I would argue that the Exclusion position is the most compelling, although I am not so sure if this falls within the realm of realist or constructivist theory. Though these theories are fundamentally different, either may be used to explain this position in the current and historical context of international society.

The Exclusion position maintains that while nuclear weapons may not be any more dangerous in the hands of one party versus another (as Gusterson evidences in his refutation of the Western perspective of third world countries as the "Other"), nuclear weapons are a prerogative of power, and powerful states have no intention of allowing the powerless to acquire them. Gusterson uses compelling historical and sociological evidence to refute Western "Othering" in regards to nuclear proliferation, thus suggesting that the Exclusion position is the result of states' policy choices which perpetuate "neocolonial hierarchies and assumptions." Under constructivist theory, this would suggest that predominately White, European states' positions on nuclear proliferation represent their preferences for retaining racial ideologies. However, the Exclusion position might also be explained through realist theory, which would maintain the definition of the position--that powerful states want to preserve their power, thereby opposing nuclear proliferation in less powerful states.

The one caveat to this realist assumption on the Exclusion position, however, is this: Why are states with nuclear capabilities not in opposition to other nuclear states with as much vehemence as to the Other? I would suggest that constructivist theory would better explain this, as it still allows for state's with similar preferences (i.e. White, European) to retain nuclear weapons. However, as we read in Blair's article, it is clear that nuclear states like the US and Russia monitor nuclear activity with extreme vigor, always maintaining a hair-trigger response (and first-strike capability) if needed. This might be the realist response to the question I posed earlier in this paragraph.

I am curious if anyone else agrees that sometimes two different theories can explain the same international phenomenon, and sometimes finds it difficult to discern which might be the more compelling argument. This is something I struggle with with theory: I like for answers to be concrete and empirical, but that's not always the case when you have a concept that can be evaluated very differently from multiple perspectives.


1 comment:

  1. I was struggling with this same thing when we were introduced to the 2x2. I came into this class thinking we would learn about the different theories in IR and track their evolution, but then eventually we would get to the "correct theories" that we should treat as truths. Quickly realized that that is NOT the case. Certain international events may be explained better by one theory, but that doesn't mean that the theory holds up across the board.

    I've noticed that I tend to stick closer to realist or neoliberal institutionalist theories in evaluating events and I think that is what the norm is. In the argument you laid out above, however, I do see the merits to a constructivist theoretical explanation.

    A true "realist" position doesn't really explain why states don't oppose other states already with nuclear capabilities at the same level they do the Other. One would think that a realist would be even more threatened by that actor than one without the nuclear power. Constructivist explanation bridges that gap.

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