Balancing the World Order

This module’s reading by Daniel Nexon titled:  “The Balance of Power in the Balance” hit on many of the questions I wrote in the margins after reading Waltz for an earlier module.  Essentially, I wondered if Waltz’s assertion is correct about the tendency of states to balance against states that aim to acquire excessive power, how then did they allow the United States to emerge in its modern form?  I was happy to see this question addressed by Nexon in his piece.

Nexon introduced the idea (which is growing in popularity), that states may, in fact, bandwagon with the stronger states against the weaker states, which appears to be the case post-Cold War.  States like Ukraine, previously in the Soviet Union’s orbit, were attracted to the Western way of doing business and jumped on board with the United States and its sphere of influence.

Waltz suggests that there are structural elements at play which will drive states to balance, but as Nexon points out, there is a flaw with this line of thinking.  For starters, it “almost always begin[s] with realist assumptions” (p. 339).  When we deconstruct these assumptions and instead adopt a more liberal take, we might understand why states would allow a single hegemon like the U.S. to emerge.

One example would be the idea of the “status quo power”, which chooses not to challenge an emerging power because its emergence is beneficial to them.  This is likely the case for the European powers who watched the U.S. emerge and chose not to balance against it as the Marshall plan was helping them to rebuild.

The question I take away, however, and look forward to discussing further in class, is what exactly will drive a state to bandwagon?  While there are certainly realist (interest-based causes) that might drive states to support the emerging hegemon, there also appear to be soft-power, ideological reasons, which drive states to support the status quo due to alignments with the rules and norms put in place within the current international order.  This likely explains the emergence of the U.S. as a hegemon and its ability to remain there for so long without any real effort to balance against it by the majority of the world.

Daniel H. Nexon, “The Balance of Power In the Balance,” World Politics 61:2 (2009).

China as the Greatest Threat to U.S. Hegemony?: A Reflection

This week’s debate caused me to deeply reflect on the idea of China and its ability to challenge the U.S. as the current world hegemon.  Before our discussions both in class and in the formal “debates”, I would have definitely gone straight to China as being the most substantial threat to American hegemony (and truthfully, was hoping our group could debate from this perspective).  Today, however, I am not so sure that is the case.

In assessing who possesses the ability to challenge a hegemon, you must first assess the metrics you are using to define that hegemon.  In the case of the United States, there appears to be three primary boxes to check: military power, economic power and soft power. 

Realists who subscribe to a Waltz-like view of the world would argue that military power is the most important metric to use when assessing power equilibriums (polarity and hegemony).  If we adopt this approach, China is decades behind the United States.  As we mentioned in our rebuttal, the Chinese spends about a sixth of what the U.S. does on its military and by even the most liberal estimates, is decades (if not a generation) behind U.S. tactics and technology.  With this in mind, it would be very difficult to make the argument that China has the ability to challenge U.S. hegemony at any point in the foreseeable future.  Additionally, in Waltz-like fashion, we don’t see a large number of powers working with the Chinese in an effort to “balance” global power.  One would think that if the Chinese were emerging as a potential challenger, numerous powerful states would bandwagon with them to offset U.S. influence.  At present, Russia (and potentially North Korea, though that’s a tough one) serves as the only real “ally” China has and we have seen the rockiness of this relationship play out on numerous occasions.

An additional approach to adopt would be to look at this dynamic from the perspective of economic gains.  This is where, in my opinion, the best case can be made to support Chinese ‘challengership’.  That said, however, there are a few problems with this approach.  For starters, the Chinese economy presently remains considerably behind that of the United States, particularly when regarded in terms of per capita GDP.  Additionally, how China chooses to leverage its economic growth (and the means it adopts to get there…which will be discussed momentarily) matters a great deal in determining whether or not its economic growth will actually matter in the long run.  Team China suggested that economy matters most because states must use the wealth they acquire to support their military.  If, however, China continues its current trends in military spending (as a percentage of GDP), when compared with the U.S., it will take an incredibly long period of time for them to even reach equilibrium with the U.S., let alone surpass it, despite its economic gains.

Finally, the soft-power approach must be considered.  While it is easy to argue that the United States’ influence abroad is in decline, we mustn’t forget just how influential the U.S. really is.  Today, you can travel almost anywhere in the world and find evidence of the United States…be it a McDonald’s, Nike shoes, or Microsoft computers.  The U.S. principles of freedom, its economic and political models of governance, and the capitalist principles it pioneered are incredible popular the world over and the same simply cannot be said for China.  Additionally, there is a great deal of political tension within China that would prevent it from being able to use its economic gains to truly beef up its military.  Instead, wealth would need to go toward strengthening China domestically to improve quality of life and this would offset its ability to compete with the U.S.  If it decides instead to neglect its people in favor of a military buildup, then it risks creating tension so substantial, it would negate any ability the state has to truly influence the rest of the world as it would be distracted by domestic disputes and legitimacy challenges. 

Consistent with the “constitutional moments” approach, the U.S. was able to seize upon the period post-WWII to really establish itself the world over and to embed its principles and ideologies within the construct of the current international system.  In order for China to do the same, something (like a world war) would have to occur to shake up the status quo, in which case, any number of powers have the potential to ascend into the U.S. role, with no guarantee that China would possess the capacity or the influence to do so.

All of these objections to the concept of China as the greatest threat to American hegemony emerged as a result of the research and discussions conducted for this module’s debates.  It was incredibly insightful and caused me to reflect upon many of the assumptions we have about the present international system.  I think the biggest takeaway here is that perspectives really matter in discussing international relations (or politics in general).  Depending on what mode of personation you adopt on the 2x2, you could get a number of different answers concerning the current state of affairs and who is the greatest challenger to whom.

Scrutinizing the Transnational: Advocacy Networks, Criminal Organizations and State Authority

This week’s discussion about transnational advocacy networks gave me a great deal of pause in reflecting back to discussions from a previous module about transnational criminal organizations.  Specifically, we discussed how transnational criminal organizations challenge state power and also briefly discussed how transnational advocacy networks do so in kind.  With that said, how can we distinguish one from the other, particularly when dealing with advocacy networks that engage in criminal activity?

In their piece titled: “Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics”, Keck and Sikkink argue that these advocacy networks are important because they “multiply the channels of access to the international system” and are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (p. 2).  Couldn’t a similar argument be made for international criminal organizations, which also multiply access channels and have the capacity to share values and exchanges with nation-states or other criminal organizations? 

Keck and Sikkink go on to say that these advocacy groups “bridge the increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms” and “gain influence by serving as alternate sources of information” (pp. 4-9).  Could we not make a similar argument for organizations such as the Taliban and Hamas, which likewise bridge these artificial divides and provide information (and much more) to both its “citizens” and the greater international community at large?

We have established that both of these powers possess the ability to erode upon state power and authority, with both challenging its authority in different ways.  Transnational advocacy networks appear to challenge state authority by working across sovereign borders and hierarchies to streamline international exchange and to influence behaviors.  Transnational criminal organizations, on the other hand, appear to challenge state legitimacy, either by calling into question its ability to defend/control activities within its own borders or by soliciting doubt about the state’s ability to act within the confines of the established international order (i.e. a state government leveraging criminal organizations to supplement its own security forces).

Much like transnational advocacy groups, Phil Williams, in “Transnational Organized Crime and the State” puts forward that “although drug trafficking groups and other transnational criminal organizations represent both private power and private authority, they are not averse to appealing to more traditional state authority when the need presents itself” (p. 166).  That is to say that like transnational advocacy groups, criminal organizations can borrow state legitimacy and leverage it to their own advantage.  One example would be criminal organizations using borders as a means to avoid being pursued and arrested for their crimes or by leveraging laws in one state against those of another and manipulating gray areas to protect their interests/activities.

Ultimately, both transnational criminal organizations and transnational advocacy networks serve to erode upon state authority and relevance.  That said, the differences between the two are not as substantial as at first they appear.  Both lack any formal “legitimacy” within the international system and both will borrow state legitimacy when it suits them.  

Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders (Cornell, 1998)

Phil Williams, “Transnational Organized Crime and the State,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge, 2002)

Europe, Authority, and Symbolic Technologies: The EU as the Vision of Good?

In her work titled “Constructing Authority in the European Union”, Kathleen McNamara makes a strong and compelling argument for the role of “symbolic power” and “political technologies” within the international system.  These technologies, she argues, have helped lend the European Union its legitimacy and within the context of this module, really seem to allude to the existence (and importance) of the global public sphere.  That said, I actually disagree with the use of the European Union as an effective example and contend that today in Europe, there actual exists a trend away from the sorts of identities McNamara discusses. 

As one of the core points in her argument, McNamara contends that legitimate authority is essentially socialized into the governed and defines it as “the ability to induce deference in others” and to “achieve a significant level acceptance without coercion” (p. 153).  The EU, therefore, has become incredibly influential and plays a considerable role within each of its member-states domestic affairs “precisely in its distinctive nonmilitary and noncoercive character”  (p. 156).  This is the first point of contention for me in this piece.  The European Union exists due to a series of binding agreements, which are designed to penalize member-states who refuse to comply with mandates.  Indeed, there is a long list of infringement procedures to be used when states fail to properly or fully implement EU law.  These procedures could easily be regarded as a form of coercion.  Though they may not be “military” in nature, one could certainly argue that the combined force of Europe’s military powers combined is certainly taken into account when actors choose how they wish to deal with mandates coming out of Brussels.

On page 161, McNamara goes on to argue that, “Governance implies self-regulation, rather than direct control, and therefore involves subjective identification and compliance” (p. 161).   She speaks of using what are essentially ‘symbolic technologies’ (as discussed by Laffey and Weldes) to “control” state actors.  Citing Bordieu, she says that “symbolic power” yields bodies like the EU “the power to construct or ‘constitute the given’” (ibid).

This is also an area in which I disagree.  While I certainly accept the notion that the European Union can easily be regarded as a symbolic technology that acts as a form of “identity” for Europeans to buy into (and that brings certain sets of rules and norms along with it), I do not believe that all or most of its member states behave the way they do because of this association.  Examples across Europe, from Britain to Romania to Bulgaria, can be found of large protests where the European Union flag is burned and where the state flag is held up in its place.  Many states reject the notion that the European Union should trump or supersede the authority of its sovereign state and this is one of the significant factors that eventually led to Brexit (and could potentially lead other states to follow suit).

That so many across Europe reject the notion that a “European” identity is superior to their national identities seems to fly in the face of McNamara’s principle of “banal nationalism”, which the author states, “are reproduced on a daily basis through banal and mundane ways, and it is those habits of mind and practice that underpin national identity” (pp. 163-164).  This banal nationalism certainly might explain why many EU states (such as Luxembourg, Belgium, and Slovakia) feel very “European”, but fails to explain why so many other states, such as Greece and UK and Ireland feel the same.  In a survey conducted by the EU, 70% of those surveyed from Luxembourg identified as “European”, as did 67% and 66% for Belgium and Slovakia respectively (European Commission, n.d.).  Meanwhile, only 33% of British interviewees identified in kind (ibid).  This large disparity suggests that perhaps there are other factors driving this self-representation of “European” and perhaps it existed long before the European Union was chartered.

European Commission (n.d.), Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/topics/fs5_citizen_40_en.pdf

Kathleen McNamara, “Constructing Authority in the European Union,” in Who Governs the Globe?, ed. Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan Sell (2010)

Closed Borders: Nationalism and the Closed Economy

In my interactive assignment for this module, I leveraged this week’s readings to make a case to incoming Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador to resist urges within his country to close its borders and to avoid limiting interaction with the international economy.  While the economic theories from the readings were the focus of my paper, I spent quite a bit of time reflecting on the causes of this inclination to close borders as well, which is what I intend to explore briefly in this week’s post.  Specifically, I want to address a similar urge popping up within the United States and Europe, which seem to be directly linked to nationalism and this constructed sets of identities that establish the principles of “us” and “them”.

As President of the United States, Donald Trump has been one of the most vocal advocates for adjusting U.S. trade policy to focus on “America First” as he and his supporters would have it.  This ideology calls for an increase in tariffs on imported goods and penalizes international trading partners.  While the idea appears to be purely economic in nature, there are also other forces at work. 

In addition to being known for their nationalistic economic approach, team “Make America Great Again” is also known for its somewhat extreme (and discriminatory) immigration policies.  The Trump Administration has been in the news quite a bit for its child separation policies, its ‘Muslim Ban’ and of course, the premise of building a “big, beautiful wall” along our southern border.  The wall (in very Game of Thrones-like fashion) is a great metaphor for the nationalist tendencies exhibited by the administration.  What exactly is the wall designed to keep out?

Harkening back to Hobbes, I remember being particularly intrigued by his remarks in Chapter 13, which read:   “What opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests” (p. 58).  This question could just as easily be posed concerning the Trump administrations regard for immigrants (legal or otherwise).  What regard does the administration have for immigrants that it wants to construct a wall to keep them out?

Constructivists might suggest that this leads to the establishment of identities that enable us to determine the “us” and the “them” among us.  The “us” needs to stay out and in a zero sum, Hobbesian way, if the “thems” gain; it is to the loss of the “us”.  In assessing the relationship between this desire to close borders in conjunction with a desire to close international trade, a case can be made that the tendency to close borders may well coincide with nationalist upswings within nation-states.

A similar example exists in the European Union, where the Great Britain recently chose to withdraw due to similar nationalist tendencies.  Even in France, with the candidacy of Marine Le Pen, who identified a large a growing nationalistic movement within that country’s borders.

It appears as though there is a relationship between nationalism and the idea of shifting to a more closed economy.  Closed borders and a closed economy tend to lend themselves well to the constructed identities that nationalists often identify with, promoting the idea that ‘what is best for us is all that matters’.  In reality, however, as nearly all of the authors we read for this module pointed out, doing so often has a negative impact on the economy.

Hobbes, T. (2000). Leviathan. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

Bargaining Chips

 

"The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."

-        Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War

 

I’d like to preface my reflection by saying that the one phrase that really stuck with me in this week’s soliloquy is: “the states that have freedom will act as they will. And the less powerful are the ones who are subject to what the powerful dictate.”

 

I have often thought about countries such as Georgia and Ukraine in this context. I have often asked the question, as the post-Soviet countries try to carve their way out of the rubble from the collapse of the doomed union, can they ever truly achieve their independence? How do they perceive independence – what does it mean to them? As Georgia has been paving its path to joining NATO, and has been aspiring to become an EU member, it has consistently failed to achieve either. It’s been documented that some member countries, Germany and France in particular, have denied Georgia gaining membership with the sole purpose not to antagonize Russia.     

    

Going back to Dr. Jackson, he explains there exists a formal anarchy between states, but while they’re actually legally constituted as being relatively similar actors, there are differences of capacity between states. Therefore, countries like Georgia and Ukraine that no longer wish to be associated with Russia, have turned into bargaining chips for the power players of the international realm. Given that there’s always been a hierarchy in practice, even if states such as former Soviet countries that became legally autonomous from one another make their own decisions, it is certainly obvious that some states simply have more power or capacity than others. I would argue that as Dr. Jackson divides states in the international system up into three categories (great powers, middle powers, and peripheral states), I would add a category for “bargaining chip countries”. As powerful states fight proxy wars (in possible peripheral states), and try to gain control over smaller states by either political influence, and divide up the world in parts they have most control in, they use some countries as bargaining chips, to negotiate with more powerful states.

 

Looking more closely at the relationship between Germany and Russia, it has been an interesting one. Both state leaders have been in power for far too long, and Germany’s dependence on Russia’s fuel supply has been constant. This trading partnership has created an odd couple that begs questions on Germany’s loyalty, values, and place in alliances, in light of Russia’s behavior toward the West, particularly in recent years.  

“Bargaining chip countries” make even more sense with respect the game the hegemonic institutions set up and participate in: this is a global order created by the dominant, not purely coercive, but rather, it comes with benefits provided to those who participate.

Celebrity Diplomacy Is a Good Thing

In this post I want to focus on the Heribert Dieter and Rajiv Kumar article from this module, "The Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy: The Neglected Complexity of Development". It is clear that the authors do not think highly of celebrity activism. They claim that celebrities lack the competence and legitimacy to deal with international issues and their actions may do more harm than good on the efforts they focus on. I disagree with this conclusion and think the author's focus in on examples that reaffirm their position rather than look at celebrity advocacy and its impact as a whole.

The primary example the authors focus on is Bono's efforts to help Africa. They claim the singer's efforts to raise aide for Africa could be doing more harm than good. Rather than raising the ability of African's to deal with problems themselves, they are creating a beggar's mentality that will prolong the continent's suffering. They argue that good government is a necessity in order for the "Big Push" of aid to help. I would counter that Bono's job and mission is not to build good government. That is not something an outside actor is responsible for. That is the job of the people of Africa. Bono is merely an advocate and is bringing attention to the plight of the people. He's not claiming to be a diplomat who will solve government disfunction. He's an advocate who is trying to provide aid to the people who are suffering.

In this example, obviously Bono is not qualified to deal with all the complexities of the situation. He's a singer not a diplomat. This fits their conclusion that celebrities lack the competence to deal with major global issues. But what about the plethora of other instances of celebrity activism where the celebrity involved is more than competent enough to make a difference? Consider Emma Watson's involvement in the HeForShe Campaign for example. In addition to being very well educated, she has on-the-ground experience working on these issues and her efforts have helped change the global conversation around gender equality. Another example to consider would be Bill Gates. Through his efforts, the Gates foundation has essentially eradicated Polio. This is no small feat.

In my opinion, Dieter and Kumar exaggerate the negatives of celebrity involvement and assume that all celebrity advocates are trying to solve fundamental problems of governance. This is simply not true. By and large celebrities are just advocating to bring attention to issues and drive conversation that will inspire change. Some will take on larger roles on issues and try to be involved in the solution, but rarely do they do this alone. In these cases, the celebrities usually work alongside actual experts in the field to derive and implement solutions. This article also does not consider the good that celebrities have already done through their activism. Without the involvement of celebrities like Bill Gates, Emma Watson, or Bono - many issues would still be on-going or worse than they were before.

Overall, I was not a fan of this article. If Dieter and Kumar want to make the argument that there negatives to celebrity activism, then they should show evidence of this from more than just one case study. I will concede that it does make one think about the potential side effects of celebrity activism, but in general I think the conclusion is misguided.

Source:
Heribert Dieter and Rajiv Kumar, "The Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy: The Neglected Complexity of Development," Global Governance 14 (2008)

Post-Class Debate Takeaways

This week's debate about the greatest threat to U.S. hegemony was a great way to end the semester. There is obviously no right (or wrong) answer to this question and I know I personally didn't come away with my foot firmly in one corner over another. The biggest takeaway for me was that all four forecasts were interconnected in some way. This made it difficult to completely refute another group's argument because there was usually a connection to your own. My group argued that the administrations pursuit of isolationist policies and our new "America First" mentality is the greatest threat to U.S. hegemony. Looking at it from the big picture, it is easy to see that the other arguments from the other three groups are all intertwined into our forecast:

1. China Group - As the U.S. withdraws from the international, this opens the door to countries who are eager to to fill the gap. Cue the rise of China.
2. Internal Division - The "America First" mentality and the administrations position on immigration is sowing internal division and increasing polarization domestically. This division makes it harder for us to course correct in the future and further isolates us from the rest of the world. 
3. GWOT - Isolationism is also not conducive for a country that has a global military presence and requires vast resources to keep the machine operating. Being cut off, or voluntarily removing ourselves, from the rest of the world will reduce our resources and make it difficult to sustain this global military presence. 

Another element that stood out about this assignment was that it challenged us to look at our country from a different perspective. Throughout our entire lives we have been hearing that "America is the greatest country in the world" and taught that we are the example to the rest of the world of how a country should be. We've been drinking the "'Murica Kool-aid" so to speak. This module reminds us that power transition is inevitable. Throughout history different actors have risen to power only to eventually see itself fall. It may not happen right away - the Roman Empire was in power for over 1500 years - but there is inevitably a downfall at some point. This exercise forced us to consider a future where our country is no longer the leading power and forecast our own demise. A rather bleak task if you ask me.

Reflecting on this module, I almost wish there was another week of class where we could have tied the past two weeks together. In Week 14 we touched on the different scenarios of transitions to a new global order: hegemonic institutions, constitutional moments, human projects. In Week 15 we debated what the greatest threat is to the leader of the current global hegemonic institution. If we had a Week 16, it would have been interesting to hear from the class what type of scenario would be most likely to happen if the U.S. were to fall. Would we transition to a new Hegemonic Institution- maybe with China on top? Would there be a new Constitutional Moment as a result of a global war, like WWIII?  Or would change result from a Human Project scenario? All four arguments this past week seemed to forecast a new hegemonic institutional order as the most likely scenario, but maybe the debate would have changed people's opinions. At the very least, I think we would have had a very entertaining class discussion about the future. 

Revisiting the Fundamental Change Debate

When considering the different scenarios for power transition that Professor Jackson mentions in his soliloquy, I couldn't help but think back to our debate back in Module 3 about whether or not the international can be fundamentally remade. Looking back, I took the position of "No, it is not possible". However, after listening to the lecture from this Module I would say that yes, in fact it can be remade.

We currently are in a hegemonic institutional scenario. The United States is the global hegemony and has set up institutions that reinforce its power. When forecasting scenarios for the fall of the U.S., if we were to find ourselves in a constitutional moment or a human project scenario, I would argue this would constitute a change of the international. Both of these scenarios would reflect a fundamental change to the behavior of states and actors in the international.

If fundamental change were not possible, once the U.S. falls there would be a power struggle that ensues and the strongest states would survive. Under the constitutional moment scenario, this would not be the case. Instead, this scenario forecasts that states would codify new rules and norms as part of a new global order. This doesn't rule out power politics entirely, but it does indicate that states are attuned to each other and may have somewhat permeable boundaries. There is some general agreement that states will work together on some level. The traditional view of the international has states in rigid impermeable and autonomous positions and they only participate in the current system because it is in their interest. If the U.S. were to fall and the system breaks, it would no longer be in the state's interest to work together so anarchy would ensue. A constitutional moment would signify a fundamental change.

The human project scenario would also be a indicator that there has been fundamental change in the international. This scenario forecasts some grave global threat will unite all actors to fight against the threat. When we were having the debate, it was this very scenario that most of us on the Con side of the argument said would be required in order to provoke a fundamental change in the international. If we see this human project scenario play out, that means that we have been attacked by aliens and not only have the rules of the game been changed, but the game itself is entirely different.

The fundamental change question is still very difficult and I waver back and forth. However, where a few weeks back I was leaning towards the "not possible" side of the debate, I have since shifted over more towards the "it is possible" side. I think a constitutional moment scenario is a very real possibility in the event the U.S. were to lose it's position as the premier global hegemony. This scenario requires actors to be more attuned and have more permeable borders and therefore and this would in fact qualify as a change in the international.

Orientalism and the Global Economy: Structural Disenfranchisement

I devoted a blog post for last module to the idea of “orientalism” and how the West has created structures and policies (particularly regarding nuclear weapons) to disenfranchise third world states.   In reviewing the Inayatullah piece, titled “Beyond the Sovereignty Dilemma: Quasi-States as Social Construct”, this theme resurfaced yet again.  This blog post will be used to explore the relationship between the aforementioned orientalism and the economic structures that have been implemented to further disadvantage non-Western powers.

Inayatullah describes sovereignty as “a political entity’s externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its own affairs” (p.51).   Structurally, third world ‘quasi-states’, are seen to be ‘sovereign’.  They have their own borders and appear to have the ability to manage the affairs within those borders however their governments see fit.  Inayatullah contends that these states do not truly possess sovereignty, as they do not have the ability to control affairs within their borders due to structural disadvantages present within the system dating back to colonialism.   “States were required to graft their sovereignty on to a productive structure historically constructed to deprive their economies of autonomy, diversity, and wholeness,” Inayatullah argues (p. 62). 

Harkening back to last module, Guterson used Edward Said’s definition of orientalism, which casts “the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where ‘we’ are rational and disciplined, ‘they’ are impulsive and emotional”  (Guterson, p. 114).  While it is true that Western powers continue to leverage third world states to their own advantage for resources and strategic posturing, it also seems possible that the West has continued to disenfranchise them because of orientalist tendencies.  As Weber stated in his piece we read for Module 2, non-Western states are not seen as “rational”, and therefore, are less capable of managing their own economies and their own affairs.

Inayatullah also argues that states have a “right to wealth”, which many states in the third world are severely lacking (p. 64).  The West today enjoys a significant amount of wealth often on the backs of third-world laborers who provide much-needed raw materials or manpower to Western industry.

I find this relationship between orientalist perceptions about sovereignty and economic growth to be particularly potent.  Much like how the West has created structures to limit the third world’s acquisition of certain military technologies, so too it seems the West may be doing the same to counter its acquisition of wealth.  Inayatullah describes the current structure as being “specialized, dependent, and colonial” (p. 62).

While I don’t necessarily agree with Inayatullah’s perspective, it certainly makes for an interesting discussion, which I look forward to having in this week’s live session.

Gusterson, Hugh. “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology 14:1 (1999).

Inayatullah, Naeem,“Beyond the Sovereignty Dilemma: Quasi- States as Social Construct,” in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge, 1996).

A World Without Borders: Cyberspace, Crime and State Authority

This week, more developments were released concerning Russian interference in the U.S. election and further evidence suggests that the intent exists to do so in this year’s midterms.  These headlines are incredibly relevant as we work through our discussions this week, including Phil Williams’ article on transnational crime.  In this post, I will examine how the Internet and other technologies serve to undermine the state and produces spaces where state authority become less relevant.  Furthermore, I’ll consider the Russian-backed hacking operations and attempt to determine whether this constitutes an “attack” on the United States by Russia, or if this falls into the ambiguous realm of transnational crime. Finally, I’ll touch briefly on recommendations for how states might work toward countering this threat to their sovereign legitimacy.

In his piece, titled “Transnational Organized Crime and the State”, Phil Williams argues, “Many observers agree that globalization is challenging the dominance of states in international relations from above, while substantial forces are eroding it from below” (p.162).  The eroding forces Williams mentions come in many forms and cybercrime is certainly no exception.  Indeed, Williams spends a good amount of time discussing the importance of technology, writing that it “threatens to undo the intersection of sovereignty and territory not least because electronic space, for the most part, is outside territorial jurisdiction”.

In a world that is structured around the concept of sovereign borders, the scourge of cybercrime does an excellent job of highlighting the clash between sovereignty and globalization/technological advancements.  With regard to cybercrime, the question of how states should go about addressing it arises.  When a criminal in Russia carries out an attack on an American system, how should this be perceived?  Does this represent a Russian attack on the United States (state on state) or is it simply a Russian criminal individually committing a crime against an American “asset” (private on private)?  How should this crime be punished?  What avenues exist for prosecution? 

Today, the U.S. congress is regarding it as a coordinated Russian attack against the United States government and is using diplomatic “sticks” (such as sanctions) to punish the behavior.  But does this really address the problem at hand?  Do sanctions deprive Russia (or the actors carrying out the will of the Russian state) from being able to continue their cyber assault?

States are traditionally seen as the only power to have “legitimate” use of force and should theoretically hold a monopoly on its use.  In cyberspace, we see that not only does the government not have a monopoly on the use of force, but appears to be almost completely “outgunned”.   As Williams articulates, this calls into question the ability of the state to maintain control of affairs within its own borders, producing doubt about the relevance of the state itself.

In my opinion, to counter this, states must invest significantly more resources into improving their cybersecurity infrastructure and will need to build an army of “cyberwarriors” to be able to aid in protecting activities within their sovereign borders.  I agree with Williams in arguing that this activity does undermine state authority, but it seems inevitable that states will learn to leverage this technology more to their advantage than to their disadvantage. 

Whether the action is considered to be a “state on state” action or a “private on private” action comes down to authority.  If the Russian government calls for and sanctions the attack, it is essentially lending or delegating its authority down to the private organization (criminal or otherwise).  If this is the case, the target state must see this as a direct attack from the Russian government and respond in kind.  This essentially leads to the identification of cyberspace as simply another “domain” (like air, sea, and land), which must be defended.  When seen this way, digital “borders” can be established.

Without diving too deep into the specifics of how states might go about countering this threat (it is outside the scope of this post), the point to reiterate is that cybercrime is presently undermining state authority.  The state can counter this, however, by increasing its focus on cybersecurity and treating attacks in cyberspace the same way it would treat attacks in any other domain.

Phil Williams, “Transnational Organized Crime and the State,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge, 2002).

Nuclear Orientalism and Authority: How the West Constrains the Third World

In our last module, we discussed Ken Waltz’s views on the structure of the international order and dissected his position on nuclear weapons, which he argues, serve to reduce the likelihood of conflict between sovereign powers.  That said, he made sure to articulate that this decreased likelihood really only applies for ‘great’ powers.   The orientalism exhibited by Waltz in his piece is consistent with other major authors we’ve read for this course, including Max Weber, and serves to illustrate the point made by Guterson in his work titled: “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination”.  From a constructivist perspective, this ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy plays a considerable role in how the international system (assembled primarily by Western actors) manages itself in matters ranging from economic policy to nuclear weapons and everything in between.  This week’s reading has made me cognizant of this orientalist structure, which I will outline further in my post.

In discussing the “game-changing” effects of nuclear weapons, Waltz says, “Although the possibility of war remains, the probability of a war involving states with nuclear weapons has been drastically reduced” (Waltz, p.626).  He goes on to argue, “The probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero” (ibid).  He admits that historically more wars have been fought between major states than “minor” ones, but believes that “because of a change in military technology, a change at the unit level, waging war has increasingly become the privilege of poor and weak states” (Waltz, p.627).

This brings us to this week’s Guterson reading.  Guterson contends that there are orientalist tendencies at play, which cause the West to regard third world nuclear weapons as more of a threat than those in possession of their Western counterparts.  He refers to this situation as “nuclear orientalism”.  On page 114, he states, “In Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that ‘theirs’ are a problem whereas ‘ours’ are not”.  This notion exists, he argues, despite a great deal of evidence to the contrary.  Before India and Pakistan had nuclear weapons, similar fears existed, yet today neither state has used a nuclear weapon.  Indeed ironically, the only state to have actually done so is the United States, a western power.

Why then, does the notion of the ‘third world nuclear threat’ described by Guterson exist?  The likely cause is deeply rooted into the Western psyche and embedded into its identity.  A Hobbesian-like fear of the other seems to guide much of the West’s actions.  “According to the literature on risk in anthropology,” Guterson writes, “shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared.” 

This perception is referred to as “Orientalism” and according to Edward Said, is defined as a construction of “the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where ‘we’ are rational and disciplined, ‘they’ are impulsive and emotional”  (Guterson, p. 114).  Our Max Weber reading served as an example of this orientalist ideology. “Science,” Weber stated in his piece, “developed to the stage that we today recognize as ‘valid’, exists only in the West” (p.149).  He goes on to say the same about art, architecture, and the economy.  Indeed, according to Weber, the very concept of “rationality” is unique to the West.  With an idea like this at its core, the West constructs governing institutions that inherently harbor these same biases against non-Western, third world, “minor” states. 

Before concluding this week’s readings, this bias had never occurred to me, specifically when it comes to nuclear weapons proliferation.  While Guterson did not outline a “fix” to this problem of orientalist policy, he did a good job of drawing attention to it and it will be interesting to further explore how it impacts Western perceptions of minor state authority in the international system.

Gusterson, Hugh. “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology 14:1 (1999).

Waltz, Kenneth. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (1988).

Weber, M. (2002). Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Weber - Prefatory Remarks.pdf

Hegemonic Institution vs. Constitutional Moment vs. Human Project: Which Scenario is Most Likely?

In the asynchronous lecture this week, Professor Jackson outlines three scenarios for future power transitions: a hegemonic institution, constitutional moment, and human project. He then asks the questions, "which one is most likely?" and "which one is most desirable?". I thought these were two excellent questions and want to explore them in this blog post.

I'm going to start with the latter - "Which one is most desirable?". I would argue that the answer to this question will vary person-to-person, state-to-state. On the individual level, the answer to this question will vary depending on how you view the international realm. If you believe in power politics and see a sense of security and comfort in power politics, the hegemonic institution would be most appealing. If you would prefer to see a more integrated and cohesive international society where different states and groups work more in sync with one another, the constitutional moment would be a good bet. Depending on how integrated you wanted you wanted the international to be, you may even opt for a human project. However, considering the conditions Professor Jackson laid out in his lecture that he hinted are necessary for this human movement (alien attack) maybe this isn't a desirable scenario for anyone.

To answer the first question, "Which scenario is most likely?", I would argue that the constitutional moment scenario is more likely in today's international realm, but that is only because of recent evolutions in the international realm. Prior to the invention of nuclear weapons, I would argue that hegemonic institutions would be most likely.  However, nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction have made this scenario very unlikely. In the Hegemonic Institution scenario, one power would have to rise above the rest and form institutions and bureaucracies to solidify its position. This is just not possible in today's world. States equipped with nuclear weapons, and the United States specifically, will prevent a new global hegemon from rising to the top and forming institutions to solidify its status. What is much more likely is states gaining power in the international forming new constitutional movements that gives them more equal status among the other global powers. Unless there was a new form of weaponry that could negate the finality of nuclear weapons, I don't see the hegemonic institutional scenario as a very likely scenario... Of course the answer to this question could change instantaneously if Aliens appear above and/or on our planet and threaten to kill all humanity. If that happens then my answer would be the "Human Project" scenario.

Coercion vs. Reason: Hegemonic Transitions and a Return to the Beginning

In this week’s module, we review the concept of the rise and fall of great powers and the establishment of global or regional hegemons.  Of all of the articles we explored for this module, Mark Beeson’s piece titled “Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The dynamics of Chinese and American power” was by far the most interesting.  This article causes us to ask the question: how do we determine what constitutes a “hegemon” and does military might really matter as much as it used to?  This week’s readings really caused me to question much of what I thought I knew about the structure of international politics and the role of coercion and reason (and by extension, interests and ideas).  I will briefly explore the previously held assumptions, which were deconstructed by our readings, below.

Military might, which is an extension of (and product of) economic power, is what ultimately will determine the world hegemon.  Or at least, this is what I thought before diving into the readings.  The nation with the biggest stick and the best ability to project its power will always possess the ability to influence politics to their advantage, either in their region or globally (depending on the size of their military).  The U.S. is a clear example of this.  With the world’s strongest military by far, the U.S. has managed to influence affairs in nearly every corner of the globe.  Backed by a strong economy, the U.S. military possess the ability to project its power the world over, which makes it even easier to influence global affairs.

Beeson pointed out that the role of military might may well be diminishing, however.  On page 96, he states “American military might is less valuable than it once was, and this has given added significance to China’s growing economic power”.  He speaks of this “intersection of material power and ideas” (99) and claims “it is not obvious that this military strength is as decisive as it once was, or that the ability of other countries like China to challenge American dominance should be judged exclusively or even primarily by their ability to counter conventional military might” (100).  He also mentions the idea that there may be other “increasingly relevant and utilizable forms of structural power”, which he suggests are softer forms of power (ibid).  This gets back to the first two modules we worked through in this course, and causes us to again consider whether it is coercion or reason—interests or ideas—which matter most in determining not only state behavior, but state relationships and how they are stratified against one another.

Beeson further illustrated this point by discussing ASEAN +3 agreement, which he argues is a result of China’s “activist diplomacy” as it  “explicitly excludes the US and reflects a much more narrowly defined conception of ‘East Asia’, rather than the all encompassing notion of an ‘Asia-Pacific’ region that has been championed by the US” (105).  By using its soft power and adopting “soft balancing” techniques, China seems to have burrowed its way into the institutional framework of the region and leveraged institutions (in upper left box of the 2x2 fashion…) to advance its agenda.  Whether or not this will eventually lead to its surpassing the current hegemon, the U.S., remains to be seen. 

With all of that having been said, it appears as though reason and ideas may well matter much more than traditionlists might contend.  That China today is working to undermine (and perhaps even use to its advantage) the very institutions the U.S. set to protect its hegemonic power, suggests that soft power may matter more at the end of the day.  While the article did cause me to rethink my assumptions about the importance of military and economic might in determining a hegemon, ultimately, I remain confident that both matter a great deal.  Perhaps military might and economic power must be coupled with some greater, over-arching ideal to really matter, but its necessity I think is very difficult to refute. 

In addition to these challeneges, this week’s readings left me with three other major questions, which I hope to discuss in class.  First, what really matters in determining hegemons (or even “great” powers)?  Are they determined solely based on the realist models that value material, interest-based power or do soft forms of power like ideas and influence, carry more weight?  Secondly, how do the concepts of hegemony and agency interrelate?  One might assume that hegemons have far more agency than their great power subordinates, but is this really the case?  The example mentioned above concerning the U.S. inability to effectively manipulate the ASEAN agreement (and to “structure” the region in ‘Asia-Pacific’ terms) illustrates how even the most powerful nations on Earth can have limited agency.  How are those limits determined?  Thirdly, going back to the Kenneth Waltz reading about structure and this idea of balancing, how are hegemons allowed to come into being?  If Waltz was correct and states are inclined to balance in Risk-like fashion to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful, how is it that hegemons are allowed to exist at all?   

I look forward to exploring these topics and more in this week’s live session. 

Mark Beeson, “Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power,” Review of International Studies 35:1 (2009).

Forecasting International Conflict

In his soliloquy, Professor Jackson discussed both forecasting and debates regarding when conflict between rising and current great powers is most likely to occur. I would argue that, to some extent, an evaluation of civil and regional conflict can be used as a tool for forecasting the nature of international conflict. In looking at the development of non-international conflicts (ex. civil wars, regional conflict), we can forecast the various factors that might impact international conflict among great powers.

We might look at civil society as a microcosm of the international realm. Though obviously smaller and--in certain instances--more unified than the international society, domestic institutions have similar characteristics to the larger, global picture, in terms of governance, political parties, power struggles, etc. As such, the ways in which civil and/or regional conflicts occur and play out may be critical in forecasting conflicts amongst great powers. When we look at conflicts in places like Rwanda, Somalia, and Kenya, we see the ways in which groups clash for power. Oftentimes, civil war is defined by power struggles between a majority power and rebel groups, eventually leading to violence and chaos. Scholars of international relations should study the nature of these conflicts to understand the ways in which competing powers might come to clash in the international realm.

Not all smaller-scale conflict can be used to predict the nature of international conflict between great powers, but, as Professor Jackson noted, prediction and forecasting are two different concepts. The point is not always to predict what will happen, but to forecast what may happen. Theoretically, a conflict between powers--regardless of scope--is still a conflict, and will have shared fundamental roots to other conflicts. In this way, an evaluation of the characteristics of civil war can be crucial to forecasting larger-scale conflicts between global actors. It is important to have a well-rounded understanding of what may happen and--perhaps most importantly--why something may happen, especially when it comes to international conflict that will have far-reaching consequences.

Mobilizing Humanity Against Gun Control

 

After invading southern Greece and receiving the submission of other key city-states, Philip II of Macedon turned his attention to Sparta and asked menacingly: You are advised to submit without further delay, for if I bring my army into your land, I will destroy your farms, slay your people, and raze your city.[1] The Spartans replied with a single word: If.[2] A laconic phrase such as this one is used among thinkers who believe in minimalism, to better deflate a pompous power, and this week’s soliloquy made me think of it.   

As Dr. Jackson brings up the question of mobilizing humanity in terms of a human project, I can envision a certain human project (other than the one he is referring to) even if it is on a smaller scale. While I will eliminate the option of uniting against an alien invasion in this instance, I know law enforcement partners of democratic societies around the world rally against crime, and that brings me to the gun control issue.

I think it would be an understatement to say that gun control is a divisive issue in our country. As it seems to be an issue that has turned into a contest about values, it is unlikely that the gun rights supporters will see eye to eye with those who oppose it anytime soon. Unless, of course, we change how we see the issue entirely. Culture is, once again, the answer.

The article published in the Atlantic earlier this year, titled “The Swiss Have Liberal Gun Laws, Too (But they also have fewer gun-related deaths than the U.S.)”[3] explores the question of what Swiss guns are meant to defend against. The Swiss trust their government more than citizens of other rich countries trust theirs, including the United States. The tradition of gun ownership in Switzerland arose more from the historic need to protect the homeland from invaders than from the hypothetical need to overthrow a tyrannical government. When it comes to the notion of safety and responsibility, it is deeply rooted in culture passed from generation to generation.

“There’s the question of what Swiss guns are meant to defend against. It is a question of trust between the state and the citizen. The citizen is not just a citizen, he is also a soldier,” Hermann Suter, who at the time was vice president of the Swiss gun-rights group Pro Tell, told the BBC. “The gun at home is the best way to avoid dictatorships—only dictators take arms away from the citizens.”

The country’s cultural attachment to firearms resembles America’s in some ways, however it has no constitutional right to bear arms. It has the third-highest rate of private gun ownership in the world (behind the United States and Yemen), yet Switzerland has a low rate of gun crime, and there hasn’t been a mass shooting since 2001. What’s interesting to the members of our society is not that gun ownership in Switzerland has historic roots spanning into mandatory military service for Swiss men between the ages of 18 and 34, but the fact that guns are popular beyond the military. Children as young as 12 are taught how to shoot as well as the rules of gun safety, and are encouraged to participate in highly popular target-shooting competitions.

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[1] The Animal Spirit Doctrine and the Origins of Neurophysiology, C.U.M. Smith, et al., Oxford University Press, 2012.

[2] Plutarch, De garrulitate

[3] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/swiss-guns/553448/