This week, more developments were released
concerning Russian interference in the U.S. election and further evidence
suggests that the intent exists to do so in this year’s midterms. These headlines are incredibly relevant as we
work through our discussions this week, including Phil Williams’ article on
transnational crime. In this post, I
will examine how the Internet and other technologies serve to undermine the
state and produces spaces where state authority become less relevant. Furthermore, I’ll consider the Russian-backed
hacking operations and attempt to determine whether this constitutes an
“attack” on the United States by Russia, or if this falls into the ambiguous
realm of transnational crime. Finally, I’ll touch briefly on recommendations
for how states might work toward countering this threat to their sovereign
legitimacy.
In his piece, titled “Transnational
Organized Crime and the State”, Phil Williams argues, “Many observers agree
that globalization is challenging the dominance of states in international
relations from above, while substantial forces are eroding it from below”
(p.162). The eroding forces Williams
mentions come in many forms and cybercrime is certainly no exception. Indeed, Williams spends a good amount of time
discussing the importance of technology, writing that it “threatens to undo the
intersection of sovereignty and territory not least because electronic space,
for the most part, is outside territorial jurisdiction”.
In a world that is structured around the
concept of sovereign borders, the scourge of cybercrime does an excellent job
of highlighting the clash between sovereignty and globalization/technological
advancements. With regard to cybercrime,
the question of how states should go about addressing it arises. When a criminal in Russia carries out an
attack on an American system, how should this be perceived? Does this represent a Russian attack on the
United States (state on state) or is it simply a Russian criminal individually
committing a crime against an American “asset” (private on private)? How should this crime be punished? What avenues exist for prosecution?
Today, the U.S. congress is regarding it as
a coordinated Russian attack against the United States government and is using
diplomatic “sticks” (such as sanctions) to punish the behavior. But does this really address the problem at
hand? Do sanctions deprive Russia (or
the actors carrying out the will of the Russian state) from being able to
continue their cyber assault?
States are traditionally seen as the only
power to have “legitimate” use of force and should theoretically hold a
monopoly on its use. In cyberspace, we
see that not only does the government not have a monopoly on the use of force,
but appears to be almost completely “outgunned”. As Williams articulates, this calls into
question the ability of the state to maintain control of affairs within its own
borders, producing doubt about the relevance of the state itself.
In my opinion, to counter this, states must
invest significantly more resources into improving their cybersecurity
infrastructure and will need to build an army of “cyberwarriors” to be able to
aid in protecting activities within their sovereign borders. I agree with Williams in arguing that this
activity does undermine state authority, but it seems inevitable that states
will learn to leverage this technology more to their advantage than to their
disadvantage.
Whether the action is considered to be a
“state on state” action or a “private on private” action comes down to
authority. If the Russian government
calls for and sanctions the attack, it is essentially lending or delegating its
authority down to the private organization (criminal or otherwise). If this is the case, the target state must
see this as a direct attack from the Russian government and respond in
kind. This essentially leads to the
identification of cyberspace as simply another “domain” (like air, sea, and
land), which must be defended. When seen
this way, digital “borders” can be established.
Without diving too deep into the specifics
of how states might go about countering this threat (it is outside the scope of
this post), the point to reiterate is that cybercrime is presently undermining
state authority. The state can counter
this, however, by increasing its focus on cybersecurity and treating attacks in
cyberspace the same way it would treat attacks in any other domain.
Phil
Williams, “Transnational Organized Crime and the State,” in The Emergence of
Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom Biersteker and Rodney Bruce
Hall (Cambridge, 2002).
I agree with the conclusion that cybercrime is a newly evolved threat to state sovereignty. I would argue that in the Russia example this should be classified as state-on-state attack rather than a transnational criminal attack - if Russia sends an agent to poison someone in a foreign country, this is considered an act by the state of Russia and not a criminal act by the Russian agent - but I do agree that the cyber domain adds an extra layer of complexity to this discussion. I think the field could benefit from more research on cyberspace and what this means for state authority and sovereignty.
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