Coercion vs. Reason: Hegemonic Transitions and a Return to the Beginning

In this week’s module, we review the concept of the rise and fall of great powers and the establishment of global or regional hegemons.  Of all of the articles we explored for this module, Mark Beeson’s piece titled “Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The dynamics of Chinese and American power” was by far the most interesting.  This article causes us to ask the question: how do we determine what constitutes a “hegemon” and does military might really matter as much as it used to?  This week’s readings really caused me to question much of what I thought I knew about the structure of international politics and the role of coercion and reason (and by extension, interests and ideas).  I will briefly explore the previously held assumptions, which were deconstructed by our readings, below.

Military might, which is an extension of (and product of) economic power, is what ultimately will determine the world hegemon.  Or at least, this is what I thought before diving into the readings.  The nation with the biggest stick and the best ability to project its power will always possess the ability to influence politics to their advantage, either in their region or globally (depending on the size of their military).  The U.S. is a clear example of this.  With the world’s strongest military by far, the U.S. has managed to influence affairs in nearly every corner of the globe.  Backed by a strong economy, the U.S. military possess the ability to project its power the world over, which makes it even easier to influence global affairs.

Beeson pointed out that the role of military might may well be diminishing, however.  On page 96, he states “American military might is less valuable than it once was, and this has given added significance to China’s growing economic power”.  He speaks of this “intersection of material power and ideas” (99) and claims “it is not obvious that this military strength is as decisive as it once was, or that the ability of other countries like China to challenge American dominance should be judged exclusively or even primarily by their ability to counter conventional military might” (100).  He also mentions the idea that there may be other “increasingly relevant and utilizable forms of structural power”, which he suggests are softer forms of power (ibid).  This gets back to the first two modules we worked through in this course, and causes us to again consider whether it is coercion or reason—interests or ideas—which matter most in determining not only state behavior, but state relationships and how they are stratified against one another.

Beeson further illustrated this point by discussing ASEAN +3 agreement, which he argues is a result of China’s “activist diplomacy” as it  “explicitly excludes the US and reflects a much more narrowly defined conception of ‘East Asia’, rather than the all encompassing notion of an ‘Asia-Pacific’ region that has been championed by the US” (105).  By using its soft power and adopting “soft balancing” techniques, China seems to have burrowed its way into the institutional framework of the region and leveraged institutions (in upper left box of the 2x2 fashion…) to advance its agenda.  Whether or not this will eventually lead to its surpassing the current hegemon, the U.S., remains to be seen. 

With all of that having been said, it appears as though reason and ideas may well matter much more than traditionlists might contend.  That China today is working to undermine (and perhaps even use to its advantage) the very institutions the U.S. set to protect its hegemonic power, suggests that soft power may matter more at the end of the day.  While the article did cause me to rethink my assumptions about the importance of military and economic might in determining a hegemon, ultimately, I remain confident that both matter a great deal.  Perhaps military might and economic power must be coupled with some greater, over-arching ideal to really matter, but its necessity I think is very difficult to refute. 

In addition to these challeneges, this week’s readings left me with three other major questions, which I hope to discuss in class.  First, what really matters in determining hegemons (or even “great” powers)?  Are they determined solely based on the realist models that value material, interest-based power or do soft forms of power like ideas and influence, carry more weight?  Secondly, how do the concepts of hegemony and agency interrelate?  One might assume that hegemons have far more agency than their great power subordinates, but is this really the case?  The example mentioned above concerning the U.S. inability to effectively manipulate the ASEAN agreement (and to “structure” the region in ‘Asia-Pacific’ terms) illustrates how even the most powerful nations on Earth can have limited agency.  How are those limits determined?  Thirdly, going back to the Kenneth Waltz reading about structure and this idea of balancing, how are hegemons allowed to come into being?  If Waltz was correct and states are inclined to balance in Risk-like fashion to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful, how is it that hegemons are allowed to exist at all?   

I look forward to exploring these topics and more in this week’s live session. 

Mark Beeson, “Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power,” Review of International Studies 35:1 (2009).