Two-by-Two

 

 

In today’s blog, I wanted to explore the two-by-two discussed in class.

 

	Autonomy	Attunement
Impermeable	preferences	interests
Permeable	ideas or values	common purpose

 

To start off, the two columns are divided between autonomy and attunement, and the two rows are impermeable boundaries and permeable boundaries.

At the intersection of autonomy and impermeable boundaries action is based on preferences: “I can do what I want to do.” This is where I see a hegemon acting on its preferences while the rest of the world has to live with the decisions this superpower makes.  

The intersection of attunement and hard boundaries is where interests reside: “I act based on what’s in the environment around me.”

The third category is ideas or values. If boundaries are permeable, it’s more likely there will be influences. “I can be seen in a cultural or value context, and my action would depend on my ideas or values.”

The fourth category is common purpose. While Dr. Jackson does not find it common within international relations, this is where I place international, but mostly regional organizations. Surely, it is hard to imagine “states singing in a choir together,” but there is NATO - “All for one and one for all.” Boundaries are permeable because we share common interests and goals and act on them.

Capitalism, Rationality, and Opportunity: Do Interests Breed Ideas?

Max Weber, in his work ‘Prefatory Remarks’ to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion, makes a compelling case for the role of interests in influencing the behavior of actors on the world stage.  Given that we were unable to put time into discussing his piece in class, I decided it might be prudent to discuss it further in this post.  These remarks will begin by summarizing the key arguments made by Weber in his critique and then proceed by putting forward the argument that perhaps not only are interests more essential to describing actors’ behavior than ideas, but that perhaps ideas are produced by interests.

Big picture, Weber is arguing that rationalism is an idea that spawned from the West and that a few key components define this rationalism and enable it to work so very well.  Among these components is “rationality” itself, which can best be summed up based on his description of the rational “capitalist”.  Weber defines this as “action” that “is oriented to calculation” (Weber, 2002, p.153) and “economic acts based on expectation of profit” (ibid, p.152).  Rational actors, according to Weber, make decisions based upon their expectation of some form of “market reward”, which is similar to Professor Jackson’s description of motivational interests (Jackson, n.d.).

Additionally, Weber focuses on the importance of systems and “organization”.  He contends that Western capitalism has worked because of “the rational organization of industrial companies and their orientation to market opportunities” (Weber, 2002, p.156).  In order for any of this to work, he also argues that “law” and “administration” are absolutely critical (ibid, p.159).

Weber acknowledges that there is a Hobbes-like world out there where actors such as political parties are “oriented toward the acquisition of political power” (Weber, 2002, p.151) and an individual’s orientation toward the pursuit of profit.  Despite this, however, he maintains that rational capitalism counterbalances this environment and that there exists a sort of “rational tempering” (ibid, p.152) that is due in large part to the aforementioned laws or “rules” of the market.

The best quote to summarize his argument is: “The state…as a political institution operated according to a rationally enacted ‘constitution’ and rationally enacted laws, and administered by civil servants possessing specialized arenas of competence and oriented to rules and ‘laws’” (Weber, 2002, p.152).

He also implies that there are “degrees” of rationality based upon the thoroughness/quality of calculation used to determine desired outcomes, suggesting that less rational actors might use “estimations” to determine their likely outcomes (Weber, 2002, p.153). 

With all of that having been said, Weber also suggests that perhaps ideas such as capitalism exist because of the interests or “market opportunities” present around us.

To advance this idea, let’s walk through Weber’s logic behind how modern capitalism came into fruition. 

The idea of modern capitalism, he argues, “has been strongly influenced …by advances in the realm of technology”, which he asserts was made possible by the West’s being “grounded in the exactness of mathematics” (Weber, 2002, p158).

He goes on to say, “the development of these sciences, and the technology that is based upon them, acquired impulses from opportunities offered by capitalism” (Weber, 2002, p.158).  Additionally, he says, “Market opportunities, as rewards…are connected with economic applications of these technologies” (Weber, 2002, p.158).

My interpretation of what is being said here is that the development of advanced technologies drove the development of the idea of modern capitalism and these technologies were developed because of opportunities for reward that existed and that were rationally pursued.  The rational pursuit of these market rewards is at the heart of the interest-based approach and therefore seems to be an example of how interests drive the creation of ideas. 

In this example, an argument could be made that absent the potential for reward (and/or absent the expectation for a certain reward), these technologies would have never been created and had these technologies not been created, the idea of modern capitalism may never have come into fruition.

Weber describes two similar such examples in his piece.  Regarding the first, “commercialization”, he states the system “would never have unfolded to anywhere near the same proportion and dimension if…a rational organization of work had been lacking” (Weber, 2002, p.157).  The second example he mentions is socialism.  Concerning socialism, he argues, “The modern opposition between large-scale industrialists, as employers, and free workers paid a wage is completely lacking outside the West” and thus “a situation of the type known to modern socialism also could not exist” (Weber, 2002, p.157-p.158).  He is asserting that absent rational organization (remembering that rationality is contingent upon the expectation of some form of market reward), the framework for modern socialism could never have been.

This methodology could be used to break down all three of Goldstein and Keohane’s types of belief.  World views and principled beliefs are little more than the result of the structured religions (as one example) being built, as Hobbes describes, to control others and to protect their own interests by teaching that things forbidden by law are “displeasing to the Gods” and to imprint their minds a belief that those precepts which they gave concerning religion might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god or other spirit” (Hobbes, 2000, p.53). 

As for causal beliefs, the science (again, as an example),that underpins the framework for many of these beliefs was produced by a market demand that offered certain rewards for its development.   

In summary, reviewing Weber’s work on the role of rationality and interests in defining action (though approached through primarily a market-based lens), it is quite possible to make the argument that ideas are in fact the product of interests and that perhaps they are even “commodities” as described in Laffey and Weldes.  This approach requires the acceptance that individuals are operating based on the expectation of some reward when they produce ideas or innovations that ultimately result in additional ideas (ideas that can be used to better organize the world around us and ultimately produce more rewards).

What are your thoughts?  What came first, the interest or the idea?

Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework. Deas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Goldstein - Ideas and Foreign Policy.pdf

Hobbes, T. (2000). Leviathan. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

Jackson, P. (n.d.). Interests or Ideas. Lecture. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://2ir.ironline.american.edu/mod/page/view.php?id=41412

Laffey, M., & Weldes, J. (1997). Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 3:2. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Laffey - Beyond Belief.pdf

Weber, M. (2002). Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Weber - Prefatory Remarks.pdf

Ideas, Beliefs, and "Symbolic Technologies": Are Ideas Truly Social In Nature?

Do ideas really matter in foreign policy?  What actually is an idea in the first place? 

In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber makes his case for rationality and contends that this notion (which has dominated political and economical theory alike for decades) is in fact, an idea—an idea that was born in the West and has begun to work its way around the world.  This idea, Weber argues, is essentially a “frame of mind” (Weber, 2002, p.161), implying that ideas are simply, as Goldstein and Keohane would put it, “just hooks: competing elites seize on popular ideas to propagate and to legitimize their interests” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p.4).

While they more or less seem to agree with the general world structuring conducted by Weber, Goldstein and Keohane put forward their counterargument in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, in which they offer, “ideas matter for policy, even when human beings behave rationally to achieve their ends” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p.5).  They go on to define ‘ideas’ as “beliefs held by individuals” (Laffey & Weldes, 1997, p.210) or by “actors” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p.4).  They continue by describing ideas almost like assets (or “commodities” as Laffey and Weldes would have it), with new ones (referred to as “innovations”) being hard to come by and with the overall “supply” being relatively low (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p.5).  They then proceed to describe the three different types of beliefs that underpin ideas and how they are disseminated throughout social hierarchies.

Laffey and Weldes, take issue with this perspective.  In their piece, Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations, they assert,  “the definition of ‘ideas as beliefs’ is quite problematical” (Laffey & Weldes, 1997,p.206).  They make the case that ideas and beliefs are quite different things that play different roles in society and must therefore be analyzed differently.  “Beliefs”, they would suggest, are “mental states or events made possible by socially produced and defined categories and meanings” (Laffey & Weldes, 1997, p.206). Ideas, conversely, are simply “elements of discourse” (ibid), which they later go on to describe as “symbolic technologies”, which form “power through their capacities to produce representations” (Laffey & Weldes, 1997, p.210).  They argue, “meaning is constructed” by ideas, which therefore assign them a great deal of weight in the production of policy (ibid).

Of the three pieces we’ve been analyzing for this module, Laffey and Weldes’ work has been by far the most interesting.  It also happens to be the piece I seem to disagree with most of all.

As a baseline, going-in assumption, I viewed “beliefs” as having two distinctive characteristics; the first being that they are often held in a definitive affirmative “is”, “was”, or “will be”, or a definitive negative “is not”, “was not”, or “will not be”.  The second characteristic I would have suggested is that individuals hold them internally.  Nation-states, or groups of people, conversely, hold “shared beliefs”. 

As for “ideas”, I would have defined them as also having two distinctive characteristics; that they imply some form of action to be taken and that they are expressed conditionally (as in “could be” or “could’ve been”).  Like Laffey and Weldes mention in their article, the “conduit” analogy seems quite relevant for ideas.  They are produced in the mind of an individual, expressed in some form of language, which acts as “packaging” and they are then “shipped” via some conduit to whomever may be on the receiving end.  In this regard, they can indeed be seen as “commodities”, which are used both to determine actors’ interests and to (borrowing from Goldstein and Keohane) serve as “roadmaps” to aid actors in the securing of those interests (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p.13).

Laffey and Weldes put a great deal of emphasis on the social component of ideation, which I personally find to be quite troublesome.  Ideas, they suggest, are “intersubjectively constituted forms of social action” (Laffey & Weldes, 1997, p.209) or “shared forms of practice, sets of capacities with which people can construct meaning about themselves, their world and their activities”  (Laffey & Weldes, 1997, p.210). They are “mechanisms” by which meaning is produced (ibid).

They go on to describe ideas as “objectified human labor”, a “reification of what is in fact a social product” (Laffey & Weldes, 1997, p. 213).  This, they argue, enables us to see them as “a process, as relations among people” and as “classes rather than external objects” (ibid).

This “social” component and the focusing on the “process” of formulating ideas is troublesome in my view.  Can individuals possess ideas independent of working through some form of social process?  In an autocracy, where the “cables” described so often by Laffey and Weldes serve little purpose but to implement the “ideas” coming from the autocrat down echelon, do these cables reveal anything of significance that addresses the original question of explaining state behavior?

While I accept the argument that, contrary to the Goldstein and Keohane assertion, ideas and beliefs are inherently different, I find myself bluntly rejecting the argument that ideas “refer to social rather than to mental phenomena”  (Laffey & Weldes, 1997, p. 216).  Can a person, completely isolated from society, possess his/her own “ideas”?  If the answer is “yes”, then is it not very difficult to maintain that ideas are inherently social in nature and even more so that they are not “mental phenomena”? Are there not ideas that never escape the confines of the human mind and that never make it into the world?  If this is the case, is Laffey and Weldes arguing that ideas are only “ideas” when they are expressed in some fashion, via some median, to become the “symbolic technology” they believe so impactful?

There are many other points of contention to be raised from Laffey and Weldes' take on the role of the idea and moreso, what an idea is in the first place.  With that said, It appears that, in order to compensate for a model developed by Goldstein and Keohane that seems to favor interests, Laffey and Weldes have attempted to tip the scale in the opposite direction by going out on a rhetorical limb and stretching the meaning of the “idea” to previously unimagined heights.

I am curious to hear your thoughts on the matter, both for and against the Laffey perspective.

Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework. Deas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Goldstein - Ideas and Foreign Policy.pdf

Laffey, M., & Weldes, J. (1997). Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 3:2. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Laffey - Beyond Belief.pdf

Weber, M. (2002). Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Weber - Prefatory Remarks.pdf

World Views, Principled Beliefs, and Causal Beliefs

As we discussed the differences in perceptions of ideas vs. interests last night, it made me take another look at Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane’s “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework.” In particular, the discussion of the three types of beliefs: world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs.

I decided to dedicate this blog to navigating through these three types of beliefs.

Tied with people’s perceptions of their identities, world views evoke deep emotions and loyalties. Examples of worldviews are religions and scientific rationality. The world’s major religions have affected human social life for centuries. Goldstein and Keohane ascribe this to the fact that the ideas have the broadest impact on human action when they take the form of world views. What is assumed in this theory is that human beings are actively engaged in managing their own destiny, because ideologies such as human rights would not have made sense in premodern societies. When it comes to exploring how the world views impact politics or foreign policy, Goldstein and Keohane explain that would require a comparative study of cultures.     

The second type of beliefs, or principled beliefs, is the set of criteria distinguishing right from wrong, or just from unjust. Slavery, abortion, or free speech hold the sense of right or wrong, or just or unjust. It is often expansive enough to incorporate opposing principled beliefs (such as Christianity having tolerated slavery in the past).           

Goldstein and Keohane put principled beliefs in a political framework, citing the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe. World views and “particular political conclusions” are mediated by principled beliefs, “translating fundamental doctrines into guidance for contemporary human action.”  

The third type of beliefs, causal beliefs are beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from “the shared consensus of recognized elites.” As causal beliefs provide guides for individuals on how to achieve their objectives, an example would be medical research resulting in cures for diseases. Causal beliefs imply strategies for the attainment of goals.    

Changes in beliefs and changes in policies

Changes in the conceptualization of cause-effect relationships take place more frequently and quickly. Changes in world views and principled beliefs are far more difficult, but when they do happen, they have a profound impact on political action, e.g. the establishment of human rights.

Ideas categorized into world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs, can have impacts on policy by helping to manage the gaps by creating balance, and becoming embedded in strong institutions; influenced by ideas both because new ideas emerge and as a result of changes in underlying conditions affecting the impact of existing ideas [Goldstein and Keohane may be referring to changes in values, both social and organizational].

Goldstein and Keohane said it best: “Our exploration of the impact of ideas on foreign policy is also a search for personal meaning and relevance in our own lives.”

Are ideas flexible?

Laffey and Weldes postulate that ideas—as symbolic technologies—are a social construction that allow you to make sense of the world. Our interests (also a symbolic technology) are ultimately an idea, then. Following this logic, I wonder how the ideas and interests of actors would (or would not) be represented within an organization meant to be impartial. 

Take the UN Secretariat, for example. The Secretariat’s members—though based out of individual sovereign states—are employed by the UN, not by their nation. In this regard, they are mean to be an objective voice within the UN rather than a representative of their state. If our ideas--which then fuel our actions--are socially constructed, however, one would assume that the desires, motivations, and actions of these members would ultimately be driven by the viewpoint they have developed given their social surroundings (i.e. their state).

Yet, I wonder if given the theory that LW provides, if our symbolic technologies are flexible and can change given the circumstance. If so, can it be argued that impartial actors might change their ideas to reflect the viewpoint/construction of the institution which they now represent? Or, does this theory ultimately reaffirm a more rational theory that our ideas and interests are indicative of certain motivations, thereby negating the possibility of impartiality in international relations? 

The application of theory in international relations (at least the theories we have discussed thus far) is quite dense and complex. Many times I find myself leaving a reading or live session with more questions than answers! I would love to know your thoughts. 

An Idea Venn Diagram?

I saw a recent blog comment from Austin where he mentioned that he tends to view the concept of ideas as a venn diagram rather than as a linear progression. I had not thought of that previously but I think he may be on to something. 

As was explicitly mentioned in the readings, and discussed in class, rarely if ever will you be able to determine an actors motivation on an issue. The system and situations are too complex for us to narrow down to one particular idea. Rather, it is a combination of different ideas that prompt an actor's action. A more dynamic model, that isn't tied to a particular progression of "ideas", would be better suited to help explain an actor's behavior. 

A more flexible model would also address the issue I had with Goldstein and Keohane's framework which saw causal beliefs as the most important of the 3.  As I mentioned in my previous blog post, I don't believe that these are the most important of the 3 "idea" categories and I think there is argument that each category plays a leading role in certain scenarios. A less linear framework would allow for ideas to have varying levels of importance and make the overall theory less easy to discredit. 

(Side, but related note: it was suggested in class that one reason Goldstein and Keohane list causal beliefs as the most important because it is easier to measure. I think that is a pretty terrible and lazy rational on their part.) 

An additional critique of their framework would be that their linear model does not necessarily allow for regression of motivation. After all, what if my motivating "idea" changes back to my principled beliefs even though I have casual evidence that would support an opposite action if I followed my causal belief? A venn diagram model of ideas would allow for motivating ideas to float in and out and vary in their importance/level of impact. 

The core problem, which I keep coming back to, is that there is not an official, agreed up on definition of what an "idea" is and what would constitute an "idea". Without that, no theory will be able to stand up on it's own. Austin and I could look at the same scenario and our venn diagrams would look completely different because we would not be pulling from the same "bag" of ideas. Before we can even start evaluating the role of "ideas" in the international system and how states determine what their "ideas" are, we need a concrete defintion of what an "idea" is. 

Interests, Ideas, and Rationality: Do Irrational Actors Exist?

As a realist-oriented person (who now also identifies as a rationalist), I tend to view the world through the lens of sovereign states (along with non-state actors), working either with or against each other in order to advance their own interests.  States will ruthlessly pursue whatever they must in order to arrive at their desired end, sometimes through cooperation and sometimes through conflict.  If an actor behaves in this way—in putting their own interests first—I consider these actors to be rational.

Professor Jackson helped to confirm this worldview of mine in describing interest-based explanations for international behavior as “rational calculation”, viewed through a motivational lens where actors have some belief or expectation of a result if they carry out a certain action (Jackson, 2018).

What I had not considered, however, was how states determine what their interests are.

Before this week’s readings, my answer would have been Hobbesian in nature; asserting that states’ interests are determined by an instinctual self-preservation mechanism and that their interests will be determined by those decisions which attain them the most power.  Because power is our best defense against a world that is determined to destroy us, it seems rational that states must work incessantly to secure it.  As Hobbes says on p.44 of Leviathan: “So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death” (Hobbes, 2000, p.44).

This week’s reading forced me to adopt a slightly different approach, however.  In Goldstein and Keohane’s piece Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, I was forced to pause and reflect upon my aforementioned assumptions about the world.  How often do states intrinsically know what is in their interests and what leads them to believe that certain benefits will result from certain actions?  Assuming that all actors are rational and that rationality is determined by whether or not they are acting based on some “market opportunity” (as described by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism)  they see available to them, how do actors arrive at the assumptions they do about the world (Weber, 2002, p. 156)? 

Goldstein and Keohane make a strong case for why these questions matter.  If the objective is to explain why states behave the way they do, it isn’t enough to say that they are acting “in their own interests”.  Rather, we must understand how states determine what these interests are.  As they put it: “our argument is that ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or end-means relationships” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p.3).   They go on, throughout the piece, describing how there are three different types of beliefs (world views, principled and causal) and describe how each of these work to influence actors’ actions.  These behaviors, they explain, influence action by serving as road maps toward their aims, accounting for a lack of game theoretical equilibrium, and/or by being deeply embedded in governing institutions.

While the authors make a strong argument that definitely got me thinking about my own view of world affairs, my primary critique is that if an actor is indeed taking action based on some form of ideation (exhibiting the “intentional characteristics described by Professor Jackson), can we not, therefore assume that the actor is behaving “irrationally”?

Throughout this module’s lecture and throughout the readings, a good amount of time has been invested in describing rationality as being calculated and oriented toward a particular aim, but virtually no time at all has been spent explaining the rational actors’ counterpart.  What does irrationality look like?  Is it simply the reverse: actors behaving in ways that lack calculation and that are not oriented toward certain expectations?

What role does the irrational actor play?  Is it not so that the irrational actor’s behavior is often unpredictable (given that it is not “bound” by the concept of rationality) and will therefore defy expected behavior?  With that in mind, couldn’t irrationality explain Goldstein and Keohane’s primary critique about the rationalist view of international affairs, which is the “existence of empirical anomalies that can be resolved only when ideas are taken into account” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p.6)?

I have a great many topics and questions that I hope to explore over the course of the next two weeks, but this is most certainly at the top. 

What are your thoughts? 

  

Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework. Deas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Goldstein - Ideas and Foreign Policy.pdf.

Hobbes, T. (2000). Leviathan. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

Jackson, P. (n.d.). Interests or Ideas. Lecture. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://2ir.ironline.american.edu/mod/page/view.php?id=41412

Weber, M. (2002). Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Weber - Prefatory Remarks.pdf

Week 3 Pre-Class Thoughts: Casual vs. Principled Beliefs

One of the first things that came to mind after completing the this week's readings was, "maybe Hobbes was on target starting with language rather than just jumping into his theory." Each reading this week seemed to have a slightly different definition and understanding of what "ideas" are. The variance in definition allowed authors to critique and oppose each other's hypothesis rather easily.

Out of the 3 readings, Goldstein and Keohane's piece, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change was the one  I most "enjoyed". Even after reading and re-reading Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Tecnhologies in the Study of International Relations, Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes lost me in their explanation of 'symbolic technologies' - I am hoping that gets cleared up more in this week's discussion. The Max Weber piece (Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion) was not as complex as I expected, but I felt that the focus was a little too outdated for today. While it did provide a foundation of how "ideas" were initially looked at in the study of politics, I don't think we'll be able to pull much from his reading to understand of how different actors act in the modern day.

Focusing on Goldstein and Keohane reading, the author's do not challenge the rationalist view of international relations, rather they say this viewpoint does not tell the whole story - interests alone do not explain an outcome. They suggest that "ideas as well as interests have casual weight in explanations of human action"(pg. 3). Human beings and actors can behave rationally and act in their interests, but ideas play a role in this decisions. They see ideas as "road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships" (pg. 3). They go on to identify 3 types of "beliefs" or "ideas" - world-view, principled beliefs, casual beliefs and say that these beliefs help order the world, shape agendas and profoundly shape outcomes.

They claim that casual beliefs are the most important and I agreed with their reasoning. However, looking at the political climate in the United States today, I think one could make the argument that principled beliefs may be taking over, at least for the time being. Two issues come to mind to support that: 1. Gun Control and 2. Climate Change. On both issues, if causal beliefs were the most important of the three, I think we would be seeing drastically different policy outcomes than we are today.

The recent school shootings and all the data showing cause-effect relationship between gun ownership and incidents of gun violence you would think would provoke some sort of policy action by lawmakers. Instead, principled beliefs are driving the policy conclusions and the result is inaction.

The same holds true on climate control. Scientific evidence (or "scientific knowledge" as Goldstein and Keohane refer to it as) point to climate change being a real phenomenon and these "ideas" would suggest action that would indicate at least the acknowledgment of climate change if not more drastic action on preventing it. Instead, principled beliefs are driving our controlling policy maker's decisions and the resulting action is actually inaction.

I don't think either instance would be an argument against their theory, I just propose that causal beliefs may not be the lead driving force "belief" type that determines an action like they seem to suggest.

As usual, looking forward to getting more clarity on the readings in the discussion and potentially revisiting my thoughts on the casual beliefs vs. principled beliefs after class.

Goldstein, Judith, Robert O Keohane. Ideas and Foreign Policy. Cornell University Press. 1993

Interests or Ideas?

In my blog last week, I asked a hypothetical question about the rationale behind the political divide in our country: Have we become so politically biased that we make up our mind first and justify our position later, rather than, think through an issue and arrive at a decision after? Well, with this week’s topic, I may just have found an answer! - Yes!

I find this week’s topic absolutely fascinating. Mostly, the discovery of concepts of homo sociologicus and homo economicus has put many issues in perspective for me (though I do find the fake Latin terms off-putting, not to mention their parent name “models of man”).

Yes, there are those of us who have no political agenda, wishing the country was not as divided as it has become. Being force-fed daily (as well as nightly) news colored with opinions (Hobbes’ importance of language comes to mind) we serve as audience to those who have interests.

The context may have changed, but Abraham Lincoln’s wise words have not lost their relevance to this day: "A house divided against itself cannot stand."

The political divide has gone so far, your love for the country may be determined by what your news source is. TV channels are decidedly politically biased, inviting speakers with similar political affiliation to add fuel to the fire. With no shortage of opinions on social media on topics that many contributors unfortunately have no clue about, they criticize organizations they know nothing about. Law enforcement organizations and intelligence agencies in this country have not historically sought public recognition as they have been dutifully doing their job. Free speech is not free, and we have many quiet heroes who have sacrificed their lives for those who take to social media to criticize them. It has, therefore, turned our culture into a “calculating engine” of homo economicus (Prof. Jackson), where the contributors perceive things in their environment, consult their “preference schedule” and express their views by having rationally put them together.

I would argue that the homo economicus bubble is about to burst. The time has come for what we truly need in our evolving political environment: the rise of homo sociologicus. This counterpoint to homo economicus, who, instead of asking what the best way to achieve his or her goal, seeks doing the right thing. Applying this concept to current political atmosphere, Senator John McCain comes to mind. Always reaching across the aisle, and understanding the importance of unity in the country where respect to each other’s point of view is the key to success.

Authors Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane have aptly outlined the framework for three types of beliefs: world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs. As we may have been exposed to political beliefs or affiliations from our parents, culture, the environment we grew up in (worldviews), and apply them to the framework of wrong and right (principled beliefs), we can strategize the attainment of our goals (causal beliefs). While the first two are more ingrained in us and therefore harder to change, changes in the conceptualization of cause-effect relationships can happen more frequently and quickly.

Morality, Law, and the Leviathan: Can International Organizations Make Peace in a World Governed By Chaos?

Throughout our class discussions on the subject of international order, I notice that a very consistent theme continues to surface.  The subject managed to insert itself into nearly every one of our group presentations and to rear its head throughout our second week dialogue.  It is also a subject that I think sits at the very core of Hobbes’ Leviathan.  That subject is the premise of the just and the unjust, good versus evil, right versus wrong, and how these are used to form judgment.  The sovereign alone, according to Hobbes, has the authority to administer this judgment and from this spawns order.  Our acceptance of this order essentially leads to peace.  Our rejecting this order ultimately leads to conflict.  

The first time I read Leviathan, I couldn’t for the life of me understand why he structured the text the way he did.  It simply made no sense to start out a work about how to structure society by addressing subjects like judgement, senses, speech, knowledge, etc.  The more I dissect the piece, however, and aim to apply his ideas into modern day politics, the more his “train of imaginations” seems to make sense.

In Victoria, Amanda and Michael’s excellent week 1 interactive module assignment titled “European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights”, on slides 5 and 7 they speak of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and how it is a “legally binding” agreement.  On slide 7, they state that it is designed to “limit “ what sovereign states within the European Union can do and how they can “interpret and apply EU law”.  Here we have an example of a charter designed to “control” member-states by implementing a law.  This law was instituted by the “sovereign”, and therefore should be considered “just”.  Should a state violate this agreement they will, as stated on slide 8 of their presentation, be held “accountable”. 

The issuance of this accountability, in whatever form it may take, is “justice”.  The law was enacted, the members all agreed, and they must be held to account to ensure that this particular facet of our order is maintained. 

The question I find myself asking is, “why”?  Specifically, why is this law just?  What morality is it based in?  What core premise of “right and wrong” does it pertain to?  Without going so far as attempting to dissect the myriad of questions that arise in asking, “what is meant by ‘human rights’?” and “what does a ‘violation’ actually look like?” I believe it is worth asking whether or not the very premise of the law has merit and if so, what that merit is based in.

The law implies that it is “wrong” to “violate” certain “rights” that should be assured to all human beings.  But why is it wrong?

Similarly, in Celesse, Melissa, and Sarah’s week 1 interactive module presentation titled “The Paris Climate Agreement”, they touch on “binding” and “non-binding” agreements that have varying “requirements” (Slide 2).  Furthermore, they identify its lack of enforceability due to its vagueness and structure (slides 5-8).  All of this in mind, I find myself once again rhetorically asking “why do we care about these emissions?” “Why should states sacrifice anything at all in an effort to honor this agreement?”

Watching all of these class presentations from this perspective brought forth the realization that morality is at the core of “laws” and that because these laws are essential to order, it should be understood.

Leviathan teaches us a great deal about Hobbes’ views on morality and the many mechanisms that have and should (in his opinion) be used to implement that morality.  On page 53, he describes how man has used religion as a bedrock with which to ground society in a moral commonplace.  On page 20, he describes the “good” and “evil” that define morality, which is “whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable.”

Hobbes teaches us that this is an ever-changing premise and that there simply is no static, persistent definition of “good” and “evil” or “right” and “wrong”.  That it will always be in the eye of the beholder. Because of this, he advocates for the implantation of laws with a single sovereign to judge.  On page 58, he says: “where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no justice”.

Bearing all of this in mind, it seems necessary that one individual (or group of individuals) must employ their reasoning on the matters of “good” and “evil” in order to create these laws that will ultimately maintain justice and order.  All of this would work well, except for the fact that the laws of nature make this rather difficult.

In a world where there is no real "sovereign", it is impossible for this universal vision of "good" and "evil" to exist. 

On page 64, Hobbes says: “in the condition of nature…every man is judge”.  That is to say, every state will have their own views on the basic morality that goes into agreements like these and therefore, even if there is acceptance of the general premise (which is not always the case), there will inevitably be disagreements over how to go about enforcement, notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of enforcing them.

This line of questioning and analysis has led me to question, much to the liberals’ dismay, the possibility of true international order.  Can international agreements exist that don’t produce some specific, tangible gain for individual signatories?  Is there truly some sort of deeper morality within mankind that is universal and that binds them to these contracts?  Hobbes makes it quite clear that he does not believe so.  What do you think?

Becker, V., Boss, A., & Girardi, M. (n.d.). European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. Lecture. Retrieved May 17, 2018, from https://2ir.ironline.american.edu/local/files/lib/download.php?id=94923&userid=2109

Cooling, M., Fitzgerald, S., & Hidrovo-Guidry, C. (2018, May 13). The Paris Climate Agreement. Lecture. Retrieved May 17, 2018, from http://american-ir.adobeconnect.com/pqwlxgmuu5hq/

Hobbes, T. (2000). Leviathan. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com