One of the first things that came to mind after completing the this week's readings was, "maybe Hobbes was on target starting with language rather than just jumping into his theory." Each reading this week seemed to have a slightly different definition and understanding of what "ideas" are. The variance in definition allowed authors to critique and oppose each other's hypothesis rather easily.
Out of the 3 readings, Goldstein and Keohane's piece, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change was the one I most "enjoyed". Even after reading and re-reading Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Tecnhologies in the Study of International Relations, Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes lost me in their explanation of 'symbolic technologies' - I am hoping that gets cleared up more in this week's discussion. The Max Weber piece (Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion) was not as complex as I expected, but I felt that the focus was a little too outdated for today. While it did provide a foundation of how "ideas" were initially looked at in the study of politics, I don't think we'll be able to pull much from his reading to understand of how different actors act in the modern day.
Focusing on Goldstein and Keohane reading, the author's do not challenge the rationalist view of international relations, rather they say this viewpoint does not tell the whole story - interests alone do not explain an outcome. They suggest that "ideas as well as interests have casual weight in explanations of human action"(pg. 3). Human beings and actors can behave rationally and act in their interests, but ideas play a role in this decisions. They see ideas as "road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships" (pg. 3). They go on to identify 3 types of "beliefs" or "ideas" - world-view, principled beliefs, casual beliefs and say that these beliefs help order the world, shape agendas and profoundly shape outcomes.
They claim that casual beliefs are the most important and I agreed with their reasoning. However, looking at the political climate in the United States today, I think one could make the argument that principled beliefs may be taking over, at least for the time being. Two issues come to mind to support that: 1. Gun Control and 2. Climate Change. On both issues, if causal beliefs were the most important of the three, I think we would be seeing drastically different policy outcomes than we are today.
The recent school shootings and all the data showing cause-effect relationship between gun ownership and incidents of gun violence you would think would provoke some sort of policy action by lawmakers. Instead, principled beliefs are driving the policy conclusions and the result is inaction.
The same holds true on climate control. Scientific evidence (or "scientific knowledge" as Goldstein and Keohane refer to it as) point to climate change being a real phenomenon and these "ideas" would suggest action that would indicate at least the acknowledgment of climate change if not more drastic action on preventing it. Instead, principled beliefs are driving our controlling policy maker's decisions and the resulting action is actually inaction.
I don't think either instance would be an argument against their theory, I just propose that causal beliefs may not be the lead driving force "belief" type that determines an action like they seem to suggest.
As usual, looking forward to getting more clarity on the readings in the discussion and potentially revisiting my thoughts on the casual beliefs vs. principled beliefs after class.
Goldstein, Judith, Robert O Keohane. Ideas and Foreign Policy. Cornell University Press. 1993
Michael, I appreciate your point about principled beliefs potentially taking over current policy matters, such as gun control and climate change. I also wanted to add that we see the influence of principled beliefs in issues of sexual and reproductive health and rights. For example, it may be argued that the reinstatement of the Global Gag Rule under the current administration is a prime example of the application of principled beliefs. Data shows a significant cause-effect relationship between inadequate reproductive health services and maternal mortality, STDs, etc., yet the principled belief against abortion has prevailed, thus depleting federal funding to life-saving humanitarian organizations globally. I agree that these examples don't necessarily discount Goldstein and Keohane's theory, but there is evidence suggesting that causal beliefs might be -too- rational to drive actions in a society so molded by other forms of influence (religious, cultural, etc.).
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