As we discussed the differences in perceptions of ideas vs. interests last night, it made me take another look at Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane’s “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework.” In particular, the discussion of the three types of beliefs: world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs.
I decided to dedicate
this blog to navigating through these three types of beliefs.
Tied with people’s
perceptions of their identities, world
views evoke deep emotions and loyalties. Examples of worldviews are religions
and scientific rationality. The world’s major religions have affected human
social life for centuries. Goldstein and Keohane ascribe this to the fact that the
ideas have the broadest impact on human action when they take the form of world
views. What is assumed in this theory is that human beings are actively engaged
in managing their own destiny, because ideologies
such as human rights would not have made sense in premodern societies. When it
comes to exploring how the world views impact politics or foreign policy, Goldstein
and Keohane explain that would require a comparative study of cultures.
The second type of
beliefs, or principled beliefs, is
the set of criteria distinguishing right from wrong, or just from unjust. Slavery,
abortion, or free speech hold the sense of right or wrong, or just or unjust. It
is often expansive enough to incorporate opposing principled beliefs (such as
Christianity having tolerated slavery in the past).
Goldstein and Keohane
put principled beliefs in a political framework, citing the revolutions of 1989
in Eastern Europe. World views and “particular political conclusions” are
mediated by principled beliefs, “translating fundamental doctrines into
guidance for contemporary human action.”
The third type of
beliefs, causal beliefs are beliefs
about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from “the shared
consensus of recognized elites.” As causal beliefs provide guides for
individuals on how to achieve their objectives, an example would be medical research
resulting in cures for diseases. Causal beliefs imply strategies for the
attainment of goals.
Changes
in beliefs and changes in policies
Changes in the conceptualization of cause-effect
relationships take place more frequently and quickly. Changes in world views and
principled beliefs are far more difficult, but when they do happen, they have a
profound impact on political action, e.g. the establishment of human rights.
Ideas categorized into world views, principled beliefs
and causal beliefs, can have impacts on policy by helping to manage the gaps by
creating balance, and becoming embedded in strong institutions; influenced by
ideas both because new ideas emerge and as a result of changes in underlying
conditions affecting the impact of existing ideas [Goldstein and Keohane may be referring to changes in
values, both social and organizational].
Goldstein and Keohane said it best: “Our
exploration of the impact of ideas on foreign policy is also a search for
personal meaning and relevance in our own lives.”
Ekaterina, I also find this to be a key focal point for the Goldstein and Keohane piece, and like you, I find the intricacies of it to be interesting.
ReplyDeleteThere are a few points I’d like to explore here. For starters, concerning world views on p. 8, they state that “the connections between world views and shifts in material power and interests are complex and need investigation.” Here, they assert that world views definitely shape political action, but seem to almost “cop out” of the explanation concerning exactly how this happens. They confess that it “needs investigation”, but how could such an investigation ever play out? My critique here is a critique I might offer to the ideation camp at large, which is how can we even determine the starting point of an “idea”?
I mention all of this because the authors maintain the position that world views, while difficult to change, are capable of the most significant impacts on political action, and are therefore by extension, some of the best examples of ideas “mattering” in policy production. Even the example they are fond of using, the human rights example, is only presumed to be such an occurrence and no real evidence is presented to defend this assertion.
Better examples seem to exist concerning internal state governance (i.e., states passing religious-based laws), but these are, of course, fundamentally different from that of foreign policy.
Principled beliefs are most certainly impactful, but are also difficult to accurately gauge/measure.
As for causal beliefs, I find these to be the best of the “ideas” generated by the authors as these most closely resemble the traditionalist, rational approach to foreign policy as the definition given implies that there is some form of “strategy” or systemic rationalization that will yield a given result. These beliefs would be, as Professor Jackson described it, “motivational” in nature. I do agree with them in that causal beliefs are most definitely the most measurable form of ideation they describe and therefore, warrants the most exploration.
Very interesting indeed. Thank you for addressing this subject.