Post-Class Debate Takeaways

This week's debate about the greatest threat to U.S. hegemony was a great way to end the semester. There is obviously no right (or wrong) answer to this question and I know I personally didn't come away with my foot firmly in one corner over another. The biggest takeaway for me was that all four forecasts were interconnected in some way. This made it difficult to completely refute another group's argument because there was usually a connection to your own. My group argued that the administrations pursuit of isolationist policies and our new "America First" mentality is the greatest threat to U.S. hegemony. Looking at it from the big picture, it is easy to see that the other arguments from the other three groups are all intertwined into our forecast:

1. China Group - As the U.S. withdraws from the international, this opens the door to countries who are eager to to fill the gap. Cue the rise of China.
2. Internal Division - The "America First" mentality and the administrations position on immigration is sowing internal division and increasing polarization domestically. This division makes it harder for us to course correct in the future and further isolates us from the rest of the world. 
3. GWOT - Isolationism is also not conducive for a country that has a global military presence and requires vast resources to keep the machine operating. Being cut off, or voluntarily removing ourselves, from the rest of the world will reduce our resources and make it difficult to sustain this global military presence. 

Another element that stood out about this assignment was that it challenged us to look at our country from a different perspective. Throughout our entire lives we have been hearing that "America is the greatest country in the world" and taught that we are the example to the rest of the world of how a country should be. We've been drinking the "'Murica Kool-aid" so to speak. This module reminds us that power transition is inevitable. Throughout history different actors have risen to power only to eventually see itself fall. It may not happen right away - the Roman Empire was in power for over 1500 years - but there is inevitably a downfall at some point. This exercise forced us to consider a future where our country is no longer the leading power and forecast our own demise. A rather bleak task if you ask me.

Reflecting on this module, I almost wish there was another week of class where we could have tied the past two weeks together. In Week 14 we touched on the different scenarios of transitions to a new global order: hegemonic institutions, constitutional moments, human projects. In Week 15 we debated what the greatest threat is to the leader of the current global hegemonic institution. If we had a Week 16, it would have been interesting to hear from the class what type of scenario would be most likely to happen if the U.S. were to fall. Would we transition to a new Hegemonic Institution- maybe with China on top? Would there be a new Constitutional Moment as a result of a global war, like WWIII?  Or would change result from a Human Project scenario? All four arguments this past week seemed to forecast a new hegemonic institutional order as the most likely scenario, but maybe the debate would have changed people's opinions. At the very least, I think we would have had a very entertaining class discussion about the future. 

Revisiting the Fundamental Change Debate

When considering the different scenarios for power transition that Professor Jackson mentions in his soliloquy, I couldn't help but think back to our debate back in Module 3 about whether or not the international can be fundamentally remade. Looking back, I took the position of "No, it is not possible". However, after listening to the lecture from this Module I would say that yes, in fact it can be remade.

We currently are in a hegemonic institutional scenario. The United States is the global hegemony and has set up institutions that reinforce its power. When forecasting scenarios for the fall of the U.S., if we were to find ourselves in a constitutional moment or a human project scenario, I would argue this would constitute a change of the international. Both of these scenarios would reflect a fundamental change to the behavior of states and actors in the international.

If fundamental change were not possible, once the U.S. falls there would be a power struggle that ensues and the strongest states would survive. Under the constitutional moment scenario, this would not be the case. Instead, this scenario forecasts that states would codify new rules and norms as part of a new global order. This doesn't rule out power politics entirely, but it does indicate that states are attuned to each other and may have somewhat permeable boundaries. There is some general agreement that states will work together on some level. The traditional view of the international has states in rigid impermeable and autonomous positions and they only participate in the current system because it is in their interest. If the U.S. were to fall and the system breaks, it would no longer be in the state's interest to work together so anarchy would ensue. A constitutional moment would signify a fundamental change.

The human project scenario would also be a indicator that there has been fundamental change in the international. This scenario forecasts some grave global threat will unite all actors to fight against the threat. When we were having the debate, it was this very scenario that most of us on the Con side of the argument said would be required in order to provoke a fundamental change in the international. If we see this human project scenario play out, that means that we have been attacked by aliens and not only have the rules of the game been changed, but the game itself is entirely different.

The fundamental change question is still very difficult and I waver back and forth. However, where a few weeks back I was leaning towards the "not possible" side of the debate, I have since shifted over more towards the "it is possible" side. I think a constitutional moment scenario is a very real possibility in the event the U.S. were to lose it's position as the premier global hegemony. This scenario requires actors to be more attuned and have more permeable borders and therefore and this would in fact qualify as a change in the international.

Orientalism and the Global Economy: Structural Disenfranchisement

I devoted a blog post for last module to the idea of “orientalism” and how the West has created structures and policies (particularly regarding nuclear weapons) to disenfranchise third world states.   In reviewing the Inayatullah piece, titled “Beyond the Sovereignty Dilemma: Quasi-States as Social Construct”, this theme resurfaced yet again.  This blog post will be used to explore the relationship between the aforementioned orientalism and the economic structures that have been implemented to further disadvantage non-Western powers.

Inayatullah describes sovereignty as “a political entity’s externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its own affairs” (p.51).   Structurally, third world ‘quasi-states’, are seen to be ‘sovereign’.  They have their own borders and appear to have the ability to manage the affairs within those borders however their governments see fit.  Inayatullah contends that these states do not truly possess sovereignty, as they do not have the ability to control affairs within their borders due to structural disadvantages present within the system dating back to colonialism.   “States were required to graft their sovereignty on to a productive structure historically constructed to deprive their economies of autonomy, diversity, and wholeness,” Inayatullah argues (p. 62). 

Harkening back to last module, Guterson used Edward Said’s definition of orientalism, which casts “the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where ‘we’ are rational and disciplined, ‘they’ are impulsive and emotional”  (Guterson, p. 114).  While it is true that Western powers continue to leverage third world states to their own advantage for resources and strategic posturing, it also seems possible that the West has continued to disenfranchise them because of orientalist tendencies.  As Weber stated in his piece we read for Module 2, non-Western states are not seen as “rational”, and therefore, are less capable of managing their own economies and their own affairs.

Inayatullah also argues that states have a “right to wealth”, which many states in the third world are severely lacking (p. 64).  The West today enjoys a significant amount of wealth often on the backs of third-world laborers who provide much-needed raw materials or manpower to Western industry.

I find this relationship between orientalist perceptions about sovereignty and economic growth to be particularly potent.  Much like how the West has created structures to limit the third world’s acquisition of certain military technologies, so too it seems the West may be doing the same to counter its acquisition of wealth.  Inayatullah describes the current structure as being “specialized, dependent, and colonial” (p. 62).

While I don’t necessarily agree with Inayatullah’s perspective, it certainly makes for an interesting discussion, which I look forward to having in this week’s live session.

Gusterson, Hugh. “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology 14:1 (1999).

Inayatullah, Naeem,“Beyond the Sovereignty Dilemma: Quasi- States as Social Construct,” in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge, 1996).

A World Without Borders: Cyberspace, Crime and State Authority

This week, more developments were released concerning Russian interference in the U.S. election and further evidence suggests that the intent exists to do so in this year’s midterms.  These headlines are incredibly relevant as we work through our discussions this week, including Phil Williams’ article on transnational crime.  In this post, I will examine how the Internet and other technologies serve to undermine the state and produces spaces where state authority become less relevant.  Furthermore, I’ll consider the Russian-backed hacking operations and attempt to determine whether this constitutes an “attack” on the United States by Russia, or if this falls into the ambiguous realm of transnational crime. Finally, I’ll touch briefly on recommendations for how states might work toward countering this threat to their sovereign legitimacy.

In his piece, titled “Transnational Organized Crime and the State”, Phil Williams argues, “Many observers agree that globalization is challenging the dominance of states in international relations from above, while substantial forces are eroding it from below” (p.162).  The eroding forces Williams mentions come in many forms and cybercrime is certainly no exception.  Indeed, Williams spends a good amount of time discussing the importance of technology, writing that it “threatens to undo the intersection of sovereignty and territory not least because electronic space, for the most part, is outside territorial jurisdiction”.

In a world that is structured around the concept of sovereign borders, the scourge of cybercrime does an excellent job of highlighting the clash between sovereignty and globalization/technological advancements.  With regard to cybercrime, the question of how states should go about addressing it arises.  When a criminal in Russia carries out an attack on an American system, how should this be perceived?  Does this represent a Russian attack on the United States (state on state) or is it simply a Russian criminal individually committing a crime against an American “asset” (private on private)?  How should this crime be punished?  What avenues exist for prosecution? 

Today, the U.S. congress is regarding it as a coordinated Russian attack against the United States government and is using diplomatic “sticks” (such as sanctions) to punish the behavior.  But does this really address the problem at hand?  Do sanctions deprive Russia (or the actors carrying out the will of the Russian state) from being able to continue their cyber assault?

States are traditionally seen as the only power to have “legitimate” use of force and should theoretically hold a monopoly on its use.  In cyberspace, we see that not only does the government not have a monopoly on the use of force, but appears to be almost completely “outgunned”.   As Williams articulates, this calls into question the ability of the state to maintain control of affairs within its own borders, producing doubt about the relevance of the state itself.

In my opinion, to counter this, states must invest significantly more resources into improving their cybersecurity infrastructure and will need to build an army of “cyberwarriors” to be able to aid in protecting activities within their sovereign borders.  I agree with Williams in arguing that this activity does undermine state authority, but it seems inevitable that states will learn to leverage this technology more to their advantage than to their disadvantage. 

Whether the action is considered to be a “state on state” action or a “private on private” action comes down to authority.  If the Russian government calls for and sanctions the attack, it is essentially lending or delegating its authority down to the private organization (criminal or otherwise).  If this is the case, the target state must see this as a direct attack from the Russian government and respond in kind.  This essentially leads to the identification of cyberspace as simply another “domain” (like air, sea, and land), which must be defended.  When seen this way, digital “borders” can be established.

Without diving too deep into the specifics of how states might go about countering this threat (it is outside the scope of this post), the point to reiterate is that cybercrime is presently undermining state authority.  The state can counter this, however, by increasing its focus on cybersecurity and treating attacks in cyberspace the same way it would treat attacks in any other domain.

Phil Williams, “Transnational Organized Crime and the State,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge, 2002).

Nuclear Orientalism and Authority: How the West Constrains the Third World

In our last module, we discussed Ken Waltz’s views on the structure of the international order and dissected his position on nuclear weapons, which he argues, serve to reduce the likelihood of conflict between sovereign powers.  That said, he made sure to articulate that this decreased likelihood really only applies for ‘great’ powers.   The orientalism exhibited by Waltz in his piece is consistent with other major authors we’ve read for this course, including Max Weber, and serves to illustrate the point made by Guterson in his work titled: “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination”.  From a constructivist perspective, this ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy plays a considerable role in how the international system (assembled primarily by Western actors) manages itself in matters ranging from economic policy to nuclear weapons and everything in between.  This week’s reading has made me cognizant of this orientalist structure, which I will outline further in my post.

In discussing the “game-changing” effects of nuclear weapons, Waltz says, “Although the possibility of war remains, the probability of a war involving states with nuclear weapons has been drastically reduced” (Waltz, p.626).  He goes on to argue, “The probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero” (ibid).  He admits that historically more wars have been fought between major states than “minor” ones, but believes that “because of a change in military technology, a change at the unit level, waging war has increasingly become the privilege of poor and weak states” (Waltz, p.627).

This brings us to this week’s Guterson reading.  Guterson contends that there are orientalist tendencies at play, which cause the West to regard third world nuclear weapons as more of a threat than those in possession of their Western counterparts.  He refers to this situation as “nuclear orientalism”.  On page 114, he states, “In Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that ‘theirs’ are a problem whereas ‘ours’ are not”.  This notion exists, he argues, despite a great deal of evidence to the contrary.  Before India and Pakistan had nuclear weapons, similar fears existed, yet today neither state has used a nuclear weapon.  Indeed ironically, the only state to have actually done so is the United States, a western power.

Why then, does the notion of the ‘third world nuclear threat’ described by Guterson exist?  The likely cause is deeply rooted into the Western psyche and embedded into its identity.  A Hobbesian-like fear of the other seems to guide much of the West’s actions.  “According to the literature on risk in anthropology,” Guterson writes, “shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared.” 

This perception is referred to as “Orientalism” and according to Edward Said, is defined as a construction of “the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where ‘we’ are rational and disciplined, ‘they’ are impulsive and emotional”  (Guterson, p. 114).  Our Max Weber reading served as an example of this orientalist ideology. “Science,” Weber stated in his piece, “developed to the stage that we today recognize as ‘valid’, exists only in the West” (p.149).  He goes on to say the same about art, architecture, and the economy.  Indeed, according to Weber, the very concept of “rationality” is unique to the West.  With an idea like this at its core, the West constructs governing institutions that inherently harbor these same biases against non-Western, third world, “minor” states. 

Before concluding this week’s readings, this bias had never occurred to me, specifically when it comes to nuclear weapons proliferation.  While Guterson did not outline a “fix” to this problem of orientalist policy, he did a good job of drawing attention to it and it will be interesting to further explore how it impacts Western perceptions of minor state authority in the international system.

Gusterson, Hugh. “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology 14:1 (1999).

Waltz, Kenneth. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (1988).

Weber, M. (2002). Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://au-mir.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/Jackson International Relations/Readings/Weber - Prefatory Remarks.pdf

Hegemonic Institution vs. Constitutional Moment vs. Human Project: Which Scenario is Most Likely?

In the asynchronous lecture this week, Professor Jackson outlines three scenarios for future power transitions: a hegemonic institution, constitutional moment, and human project. He then asks the questions, "which one is most likely?" and "which one is most desirable?". I thought these were two excellent questions and want to explore them in this blog post.

I'm going to start with the latter - "Which one is most desirable?". I would argue that the answer to this question will vary person-to-person, state-to-state. On the individual level, the answer to this question will vary depending on how you view the international realm. If you believe in power politics and see a sense of security and comfort in power politics, the hegemonic institution would be most appealing. If you would prefer to see a more integrated and cohesive international society where different states and groups work more in sync with one another, the constitutional moment would be a good bet. Depending on how integrated you wanted you wanted the international to be, you may even opt for a human project. However, considering the conditions Professor Jackson laid out in his lecture that he hinted are necessary for this human movement (alien attack) maybe this isn't a desirable scenario for anyone.

To answer the first question, "Which scenario is most likely?", I would argue that the constitutional moment scenario is more likely in today's international realm, but that is only because of recent evolutions in the international realm. Prior to the invention of nuclear weapons, I would argue that hegemonic institutions would be most likely.  However, nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction have made this scenario very unlikely. In the Hegemonic Institution scenario, one power would have to rise above the rest and form institutions and bureaucracies to solidify its position. This is just not possible in today's world. States equipped with nuclear weapons, and the United States specifically, will prevent a new global hegemon from rising to the top and forming institutions to solidify its status. What is much more likely is states gaining power in the international forming new constitutional movements that gives them more equal status among the other global powers. Unless there was a new form of weaponry that could negate the finality of nuclear weapons, I don't see the hegemonic institutional scenario as a very likely scenario... Of course the answer to this question could change instantaneously if Aliens appear above and/or on our planet and threaten to kill all humanity. If that happens then my answer would be the "Human Project" scenario.

Coercion vs. Reason: Hegemonic Transitions and a Return to the Beginning

In this week’s module, we review the concept of the rise and fall of great powers and the establishment of global or regional hegemons.  Of all of the articles we explored for this module, Mark Beeson’s piece titled “Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The dynamics of Chinese and American power” was by far the most interesting.  This article causes us to ask the question: how do we determine what constitutes a “hegemon” and does military might really matter as much as it used to?  This week’s readings really caused me to question much of what I thought I knew about the structure of international politics and the role of coercion and reason (and by extension, interests and ideas).  I will briefly explore the previously held assumptions, which were deconstructed by our readings, below.

Military might, which is an extension of (and product of) economic power, is what ultimately will determine the world hegemon.  Or at least, this is what I thought before diving into the readings.  The nation with the biggest stick and the best ability to project its power will always possess the ability to influence politics to their advantage, either in their region or globally (depending on the size of their military).  The U.S. is a clear example of this.  With the world’s strongest military by far, the U.S. has managed to influence affairs in nearly every corner of the globe.  Backed by a strong economy, the U.S. military possess the ability to project its power the world over, which makes it even easier to influence global affairs.

Beeson pointed out that the role of military might may well be diminishing, however.  On page 96, he states “American military might is less valuable than it once was, and this has given added significance to China’s growing economic power”.  He speaks of this “intersection of material power and ideas” (99) and claims “it is not obvious that this military strength is as decisive as it once was, or that the ability of other countries like China to challenge American dominance should be judged exclusively or even primarily by their ability to counter conventional military might” (100).  He also mentions the idea that there may be other “increasingly relevant and utilizable forms of structural power”, which he suggests are softer forms of power (ibid).  This gets back to the first two modules we worked through in this course, and causes us to again consider whether it is coercion or reason—interests or ideas—which matter most in determining not only state behavior, but state relationships and how they are stratified against one another.

Beeson further illustrated this point by discussing ASEAN +3 agreement, which he argues is a result of China’s “activist diplomacy” as it  “explicitly excludes the US and reflects a much more narrowly defined conception of ‘East Asia’, rather than the all encompassing notion of an ‘Asia-Pacific’ region that has been championed by the US” (105).  By using its soft power and adopting “soft balancing” techniques, China seems to have burrowed its way into the institutional framework of the region and leveraged institutions (in upper left box of the 2x2 fashion…) to advance its agenda.  Whether or not this will eventually lead to its surpassing the current hegemon, the U.S., remains to be seen. 

With all of that having been said, it appears as though reason and ideas may well matter much more than traditionlists might contend.  That China today is working to undermine (and perhaps even use to its advantage) the very institutions the U.S. set to protect its hegemonic power, suggests that soft power may matter more at the end of the day.  While the article did cause me to rethink my assumptions about the importance of military and economic might in determining a hegemon, ultimately, I remain confident that both matter a great deal.  Perhaps military might and economic power must be coupled with some greater, over-arching ideal to really matter, but its necessity I think is very difficult to refute. 

In addition to these challeneges, this week’s readings left me with three other major questions, which I hope to discuss in class.  First, what really matters in determining hegemons (or even “great” powers)?  Are they determined solely based on the realist models that value material, interest-based power or do soft forms of power like ideas and influence, carry more weight?  Secondly, how do the concepts of hegemony and agency interrelate?  One might assume that hegemons have far more agency than their great power subordinates, but is this really the case?  The example mentioned above concerning the U.S. inability to effectively manipulate the ASEAN agreement (and to “structure” the region in ‘Asia-Pacific’ terms) illustrates how even the most powerful nations on Earth can have limited agency.  How are those limits determined?  Thirdly, going back to the Kenneth Waltz reading about structure and this idea of balancing, how are hegemons allowed to come into being?  If Waltz was correct and states are inclined to balance in Risk-like fashion to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful, how is it that hegemons are allowed to exist at all?   

I look forward to exploring these topics and more in this week’s live session. 

Mark Beeson, “Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power,” Review of International Studies 35:1 (2009).